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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the crash heard 'round the world on September 11, 2001,
the Taliban and other Islamic hard-liners have come under international scru-
tiny, and majority-Muslim countries are reevaluating the relationship between
Islam and government. Although some interpretations of the governing struc-
ture mandated by Islamic law may clash with ideals of popular sovereignty,
others may allow a harmonization of the two.' No country yet has formulated
the perfect balance between implementing a government that achieves both de-
mocratic and Islamic ideals, but Turkey has made great strides in that direction.
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey experienced an identity crisis. Both
the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly independent
Turkic states changed the face of Turkish political rhetoric, particularly that of
the ongoing westernization/modernization debate. Generally, the pro-Western
secularists have prevailed in the debate, but Turkey has experienced a steady
proliferation in religiously based political ideologies since the 1960s, and the
recent growth in popularity of Islamist parties has paved the way for reopening
the discussion and reevaluating the role of religion in Turkey's secular society.
During the Cold War, Turkey's membership in NATO and its staunchly
pro-Western, anti-communist stance sufficiently diffused the more traditional
Islamic elements in the society because of the common interest in preserving
territorial integrity and in uniting against an ancient rival-Russia. In the Turk-
ish domestic fight against organizations promoting Marxism, the restrictions on
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 2000; M.A. in Church-State Studies, Baylor University, 1996;
B.A., Baylor University, 1994. The author wishes to thank Derek H. Davis, William A. Mitchell,
and Colbert C. Held for their advice and direction.
For a discussion of how Islam and secularism are not incompatible, see Mehrzad Borou-
jerdi, Can Islam Be Secularized? in IN TRANSMON: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN
MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES (M.R. Ghanoonparvar & Faridoun Farrokh eds., 1993); Michael
King, Religion into Law, Law into Religion: The Construction of a Secular Identity for Islam, in
NATIONALISM, RAcISM, AND THE RuLE OF LAW (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1995).
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religion were relaxed so that Islam could serve as an effective ideological
weapon.
In the war against terrorism, Turkey once again has a critical role as a
NATO ally. As the United States seeks to build a coalition against terrorists in
the Middle East, a study of the role of Islam in Turkish culture has significance
in several dimensions. First, a case study of Turkey as the only secular Muslim
state offers the opportunity to explore the challenges inherent in adapting secu-
larism and democracy to an Islamic context. Turkey's ability to satisfactorily
resolve the conflict over the role of religion will aid the country in progressing
toward political stability for the next millennium. Second, an examination of
the historical roots of Turkish secularism in the context of Islamic law may shed
new light on alternative solutions to the conflict over the implementation of
secular democracy.
Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work The Clash of Civilizations?,
claims that a country redefining its identity must have the support of the public
2as well as of the political and economic elite. Although secularism in Turkey
largely has the support of the educated elite, certain adherents of Islam still
claim that the only appropriate government for Muhammad's followers is that
which corresponds to the Quran. Ironically, no agreement exists even among
so-called fundamentalists as to what such a government would look like. Mus-
lim religious scholars have not even arrived at a consensus on which writings of
Muhammad are actually applicable to the government of a nation-state.
Turkish-style secularism, however, allows little public religious expres-
sion, and the Turkish Islamists (moderate by most standards) find that a call for
removing restrictions on religious free exercise resonates with the agricultural
workers, small shopkeepers, and low-skilled laborers. The educated elites and
the military still vehemently support Western-style democracy and EU member-
ship, but political parties favoring a greater role for Islam in Turkish society
have steadily gained in popularity, suggesting that a significant percentage of
the population desires a reevaluation of the secularist and/or pro-Western poli-
cies of the Turkish government. The conflict over the role of religion in mod-
ernization creates yet another brick in the wall between the urban and rural
populations as well as between the elite and the masses.
By examining the Turkish experience, one can observe its travails in
imposing a Western secularist framework on an Islamic society. Today, the
difficulties it experiences in coalescing the religious and secular elements in its
population into a well-functioning democracy stem not from any intrinsic inabil-
ity to reconcile moderate Islam with democracy per se, but rather from an inabil-
ity to forge an appropriate separation between state and religion. Constructing a
higher wall of separation, to use a well-worn metaphor, would defuse tensions
between the staunch proponents of Turkey's particular brand of secularism and
those who would prefer more religion in the public square. Measures accom-
2 Samuel P. Huntington, A Clash of Civilizations?, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENDA 1994:
CRITICAL ISSUES IN FOREIGN POUCY (1994).
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plishing this purpose would benefit not only the Islamists, by giving them more
freedom to practice their religion, but also the government, by creating a more
stable foundation for secular democracy.
In traction between the civilizations of East and West, European Union
and Islamic community, secularism and fundamentalism, the resolution and
synthesis inherent in Turkish society constantly provides creative tension as
Turkey implements principles of secular democracy in an Islamic context. This
article will examine the historical and philosophical basis of the Turkish parlia- °
mentary movement, the establishment of the modem republic at the expense of
the traditional Islamic institutions, and the continuing debate over the proper
role of Islam in the Turkish secular democracy.
II. ISLAMIC FOUNDATIONS
The tenets of Islam shaped the formation of the Ottoman Empire. 3 Mu-
hammad formed a community of believers (umma, Turkish: iimmet) based on
the Quranic idea of the "One Creator-Sustainer God, of the necessity of socio-
economic justice, and of the Last Judgment."4 Islam teaches that nations will be
judged collectively by the quality of their behavior; thus, much of the scriptural
teachings deal with guidelines for conduct in this world rather than musings
about the next.
5
Although a plethora of sects developed from schisms after Muham-
mad's death and from differences among schools of interpretation of the Quran,6
3 The term "Islam" means submission in the Arabic language, and a Muslim is a person who
submits to the will of God. COLBERT C. HELD, MIDDLE EAST PATTERNS: PLACES, PEOPLE, AND
POLITICS 81 (2d ed. 1991). Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, claimed to have received revela-
tions from Allah via the angel Gabriel that were later recorded in the Quran, the scripture of Islam.
Muslims do not worship Muhammad, but view him as the last and greatest of God's prophets after
Moses and Jesus. Id. at 81-82. The basic message of the faith is the shahadah (profession of
faith): "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the messenger of God." Id. at 83. The shahadah
constitutes the first of the five pillars of Islam. The remaining four are: salah, prayer five times
per day facing the Kaabah (House of God) in Mecca; zakat, payment of a religious tax and volun-
tary almsgiving; sawm, fasting during the month of Ramadan (Turkish: Ramazan); and the hajj,
the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Id. at 83.
Muhammad denounced the pagan religious prevalent in Mecca in the seventh 'century and
proclaimed al-Lah, already the head of the Arabian pantheon, as the only God. Allah had long
been identified as identical to the God of Jews and Christians, but the Quraysh tribe of Mecca did
not wish to relinquish their pagan gods in order to follow Muhammad's vision of monotheism.
Public opinion quickly turned against Muhammad ibn Abdulla, and he fled to Yathrib, later
known as Medina, "the City of the Prophet." The year of the migration, 622 C.E., became the first
year of the Islamic calendar, which marks the passage of time according to "years of the Hegira"
(flight). Id. at 81-82.
4 FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION 13-14 (1982).
5 Id.
6 The four major schools of Sunni Islam today are (1) the Hanafi (Pakistan, Turkey, and
[Vol. 105
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/5
SEPARATION OF MOSQUE AND STATE
the later Ottoman state embraced all these variants as well as other religions and
nationalities in its government. A state is Islamic "by virtue of a conscious ap-
plication of the sociopolitical tenets of Islam to the life of the nation, and by an
incorporation of those tenets in the basic constitution of the country."7 The truly
Islamic state does not recognize popular sovereignty because all law comes
from God and is immutable as such.8 Law for the Islamic community is embod-
ied in the shariah (Turkish: sheriat),9 a code based on the Quran and the Sunna,
a compilation of laws deduced from the sayings or practices of the Prophet.'0
In Islamic thought, "rights" derive not from nature, but from duties
owed to God and other persons." Individualism and personal autonomy as con-
Egypt); (2) the Shafi (Indonesia and East Africa); (3) the Maliki (North Africa); and (4) the Han-
bali (Saudi Arabia). Of these, the Hanafi school is the most accepting of opinions of Islamic
scholars. See, e.g., C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 40 (1988); RENE DAVID & E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY 421-31 (1985). Shi'a Muslims have their own schools of jurisprudence. Shi'a differ from
the Sunnis because they believe that they are the only descendants of Ali, the fourth caliph. See
Gregory Rose, Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah
Khomeini, in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN IRAN: SHI'ISM FROM QUIETISM TO REVOLUTION 168-69
n.j 1 (Nikki R. Keddie, ed. 1983).
7 MEHRAN TAMADONFAR, THE ISLAMIC POLITY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP:
FUNDAMENTALISM, SECTARIANISM, AND PRAGMATISM 40 (1989) (quoting MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE
PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM 1 (1961)).
8 See ANN K.S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY 1 (1981) (noting that because God heads the com-
munity of believers, he is the sole legislator, and law can only be that which God revealed to the
prophets).
9 The principle sources of the sheriat (literally translated "the way") are the Quran, the sun-
nah, the conventions and practices of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and the opinions of the
great Islamic jurists. See, e.g., id. at 45 (quoting ABUL A'LA MAWDUDI, ISLAMIC LAW AND
CONSTITUTION 217-19 (1967)). Secondary sources of law are ijma (consensus) and qiyas (reason-
ing by analogy). See generally WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6; H.A.R. GIBB, ISLAM: A HISTORICAL
SURVEY 63-64 (2d ed. 1953).
10 While the Quran is considered supremely authoritative, infallible, and unalterable, one may
turn to the Sunna for guidance where the Quran is silent. Thousands of scholars compiled the
Sunna about one hundred years after Muhammad's death as a means of resolving interpretive
disputes. The process of compiling the Sunna is called Hadith ("tradition"). Donna E. Arzt, He-
roes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents under Islamic Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 349, 366-67 (1996).
When neither Quran nor Sunna offers a relevant passage, one may look to ijma ("consen-
sus"), which is "a body of fixed rules reflecting the unanimous agreement of Islamic scholars, so
long as their collective view does not conflict with the Quran and Sunna." Id. at 367; see also
WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 39 ("[T]he authority of ijma is based upon distrust of the indi-
vidual opinion. There is assurance of freedom from error in the communal mind.").
If none of these sources suffices, "individual Islamic scholars, like common law jurists, can
derive [a relevant rule] through logical inference from the primary sources and reasoning by anal-
ogy [qiyas]." Arzt, supra note 10, at 367. To engage in this interpretive process, which is called
ijtihad, requires special training. Id.
u Abdul Aziz-Said, Human Rights in Islamic Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND
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ceived by Western culture do not exist.12 Thus, Islamic law does not seek to
safeguard the rights of the individual, but rather to ensure the welfare of the
community. 13 Moreover, Muslims view the body politic as ordained by God
and believed that the ruler, no matter how decadent or inept, was "a divinely
ordained necessity, and that the Sunni community, organized in the body politic,
was the unchanging medium of God's guidance."' 4  As a result, Islamic law
does not make a distinction between the individual and the state, and few schol-
ars believe that the Islamic state is essentially democratic.15
In this sense, that God alone makes law and confers authority, the Is-
lamic state is theocratic. Despite the divinely ordered nature of the political
community, the Islamic state structure in another sense cannot be categorized as
theocratic in classical times because no church or priestly office mediated be-
tween God and the believer and no religious hierarchy controlled the state gov-
ernment. 16  The Ottoman system of hierarchical religious leaders, however,
changed this original structure into a more theocratic one by installing religious
experts as judges to interpret the law. 17
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 92 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, eds. 1979) ("Human rights
exist only in relation to human obligations owed toward God, fellow humans and nature. When
individuals meet these obligations they acquire certain rights and freedoms. Those who do not
accept these obligations have no rights, and any claims of freedom that they make upon society
lacks justification.").
12 Arzt, supra note 10, at 371.
13 Mohammed Talbi, Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS 180 (Leonard Swidler, ed. 1986); Arzt, supra note
10, at 371.
14 BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 26 (1988) [hereinafter LEWIS,
POLITICAL LANGUAGE].
15 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights
in the Islamic Criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 23 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 1982) ("Unlike Western philosophical and political perceptions of the sepa-
rability of the individual and the state, Islamic social concepts do not make such a distinction. The
individual does not stand in any adversary position vis-A-vis the state but is an integral part
thereof."); LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, supra note 14, at 113 ("The effectiveness of the Holy
Law as a limitation on the power of the sovereign was flawed in two important respects. One was
that the law itself gave the ruler extensive autocratic powers. The second was that while the law
prescribed limitations both on the authority of the ruler and the duty of obedience of the subject, it
established no apparatus and laid down no procedures for enforcing these limitations, and no
device for preventing or challenging a violation of the law by the ruler, other than force."). To
command obedience, however, state authorities must be acting in accordance with the sheriat. See
LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, supra note 14, at 91-116. But see MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE
PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM 1 (1961) (arguing that the restrictions placed on
the individual rights of the members of the umma and the leadership of the tribe by consensus of
the elders coincide with "an integral component of the Western conception of democracy").
16 ASAD, supra note 15, at 29-30.
17 Id. Qadis, or judges of Islamic law courts, held office at the pleasure of the sultan, who also
reviewed their judgments. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION
[Vol. 105
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The Turks had a significant impact on the Islamic state. The Turkish
dynasties that controlled Islamic territories from the eleventh to the fourteenth
centuries were able to coordinate land ownership, taxation, religion, govern-
ment, and mobilization for war better than any other Islamic empire.'8  Signifi-
cantly, the Ottomans built their empire on the principle of military conquest
infused with religious fervor,' 9 an idea that pervaded the Ottoman state through-
out its history.20 Also importantly, the Ottomans fused religion with the state
AND POLITICS 49 (1991); Aziz-Said in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 88; N.J. Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58-59 (1957); N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 120-34 (1964);
Arzt, supra note note 10, at 372.
Ottoman judicial interpretations of Islamic law had to reflect not only legal codes, but the
body of available legal literature. Interpretation in medieval Islamic jurisprudence took two
forms: ijtihad ("exerting oneself to the limit") and taqlid ("investing with authority"). A doctrine
6ecomes part of consensus when no dissenting opinions can be found in the writings of previous
generations of mufti. An opinion defeated in disputation is eliminated from orthodoxy. Thus, the
orthodox in Islam is determined by process of elimination. See George Makdisi, Freedom in
Islamic Jurisprudence: Ijtihad, Taqlid, and Academic Freedom, reprinted in GEORGE MAKDISI,
RELIGION, LAW & LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ISLAM 81-82 (1991). Despite the open scholastic at-
mosphere that first prevailed, by the end of the ninth century, Islamic legal scholars had decided
that all essential questions had been settled, and no one from that point on would have the neces-
sary qualifications for independent reasoning. All future activity, then, would be confined to
explanation, application, and interpretation of existing law. See Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of
Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 3 (1984). The school of Abu Hanifa to which the
Ottomans adhered "retained a considerable element of personal reading" even after this so-called
closing of the gate of ijtihad. GIBB, supra note 9, at 70. Essentially, Ottoman scholars applied
ijtihad under the guise of qiyas. See Hallaq, supra note 17, at 3.
18 BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM IN HISTORY: IDEAS, PEOPLE, AND EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 189-
207 (2d ed. 1993).
19 Classical Islam divides the world between Muslim believers (dar al-Islam) and the rest of
the world (dar al-Harb), or the territory of war. Arzt, supra note 10, at 379. Through the process
of jihad, ("effort" or "sacrifice"), the Muslims exercised their religious and legal duty to subjugate
the infidel and spread the word of Allah. Id. Arzt analogizes the concept to the modem idea of
using "national security" as a rationale for state action. Id. She explains, however, thatjihad need
not require violent military conduct, but may also encompass preaching and example. Id. at 380.
As the Ottomans spread their empire, jihad became fused with the goal of territorial expan-
sion. Warriors known as ghazis followed a canon of rules for living a virtuous life (futuwwa), as
interpreted by mystical Islam. Loyalty to the caliph according to the futuwwa was based on mu-
tual obligation, but followers only gave their allegiance to the chief so long as he provided them
with income in the form of booty. Of all the Turkish ghazi cultures in Anatolia that emerged as
the Seljuk empire declined, only the Ottomans were able to forge viable political institutions out
of the military culture. See LORD PATRICK KINROSS, THE OTrOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE 17-32 (1977) [hereinafter THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES].
20 Fifteenth century chronicler Mustafa Naima explains the role of the military in society in his
"Cycle of Equity," a basis for political organization: (1) the military must exist in order for the
state (devlet) or conditions of justice (mulk) to exist; (2) maintaining the military requires wealth;
(3) wealth derives from the subjects; (4) the subjects only prosper under conditions of justice; and
(5) without conditions of justice, justice itself cannot exist. Therefore, exploitation of wealth for
securing justice via supporting the ruler and the military law is at the root of political practice. See
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structure.2 1  First, they institutionalized the class of religious academicians
(ulema) as the expert body to achieve consensus on religious matters, 22 and in-
troduced the principle of tolerance of Christians and Jews as dhimmi (non-
Muslims who believe in God and the Bible).23 Second, they raised Islamic law
to a position of prime importance in state administration by combining the head
of state, the sultan, and the highest religious leader, the caliph, in the personage
of the padishah, who held the highest position in the Islamic view of world or-
der.24 This combination resulted in an extreme respect for tradition and the
principle of maintaining order in the polity.
25
III. THE FIRST TURKISH REPUBLIC
The strategic location of Turkey on the Bosporus places it at a cross-
roads between two continents and two civilizations.2p Janus-like, it simultane-
ously faces East and West. The history of Osman's descendents portrays a con-
stant tension between the two as the Ottomans expanded westward while their
Islamic heritage drew their attention toward Mecca.27
L.V. THOMAS, A STUDY OF NAIMA 78 (1972); SARI MEHMED PASHA, OTrOMAN STATECRAFT 119
n.19 (W.L. Wright ed. & trans., 1935); 1 STANFORD J. SHAW & EzEL KuRAL SHAW, HISTORY OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 112 (1976).
21 This is called din-u-devlet. The muftis maintained the link between religion (din) and the
state (deviet) through their power to issue authoritative opinions (fetvas). The Chief Mufti, the
Shaykh al-Islam, had power almost equivalent to that of the Grand Vizier in state affairs. NIYAZI
BERKES, DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 15 (1964).
22 LEWIS, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, supra note 14, at 31-32. These ulema were divided into
jurisconsults who studied and interpreted the law (mufti) and judges who enforced it (qadi). At
the head of the ulema was the Shaykh al-Islam. 1 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 135.
23 PAUL WITrEK, THE RISE OF THE OTrOMAN EMPIRE 42-43 (reprint 1971) (1938).
24 HALIL INALCIK, THE OTrOMAN EMPIRE: THE CLASSICAL AGE (1300-1600) 33-57 (Norman
Itzkowitz & Colin Imber trans., 1973).
25 BERKES, supra note 21, at 10-11. In a further innovation, Muslim scholars granted the
sultan the right of prerogative (tdrf) to decree secular policies (kanun) in matters the sheriat did not
cover, although some jurists considered it unnecessary. See 1 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at
134; INALCIK, supra note 24, at 70; SERIF MARDiN, THE GENESIS OF YOUNG OTTOMAN THOUGHT
104(1962).
26 For a thorough description of Ottoman and early Turkish history, see generally 1 SHAW &
SHAw, supra note 20; BERKES, supra note 21; M. PHILLIPS PRICE, A HISTORY OF TURKEY FROM
EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC (196 1).
27 The Ottoman Empire reached its zenith under Suleiman the Magnificent in the sixteenth
century. V.J. Parry, The Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent, 1520-66, in THE HISTORY OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO 1730, at 101-02 (M.A. Cook ed., 1976). When Suleiman ascended the
throne, the Ottoman Empire encompassed Constantinople, Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo, and it
had guardianship of Mecca, and Medina. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
TURKEY: A COUNTRY STUDY 26-27 (4th ed.) (Paul M. Pittman, In ed., 1988). Suleiman's father,
Selim I, had unified the sultanate (the secular ruler of the Ottoman Empire) and the caliphate (the
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Once the Ottoman Empire began lagging behind the West in its techno-
logical and economic development, the loss of absolute superiority in education
and technology forced scholars and rulers alike to examine the issue of "mod-
ernization. ' '28 Although the wholesale adoption of Western technology for mili-
tary improvements appealed to the Ottomans, the incorporation of other reforms
in education and politics offended the religious sensibilities of the religious hi-
erarchy and many Muslim citizens.29
religious head of the Islamic world) in his own person and in that of his successors. Id. Suleiman,
as head of the state and defender of the faith, drafted his legislation with the help of religious
scholars (ulema) so as to comply with the commands of Islamic law (sheriat). He raised the status
of the ulema by exempting them from taxation and immunizing them from confiscation of prop-
erty; he created a hereditary class of professors and lawyers. KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES,
supra note 19, at 211. Moreover, he elevated the Shaykh al-Islam, the highest ranking religious
leader, to equal status with the Grand Vizier (sadrazam), his chief executive adviser. Id. In this
golden age, Suleiman not only led his army to the gates of Vienna in 1526, but also dispensed
justice wisely and fairly in accordance with religious tradition. Id.
After the death of Suleiman I, the innate conservatism in the Ottoman legal system and in
the society as a whole prevented the empire from adapting to meet the needs of its rapidly growing
population and worsening economic conditions. BERKES, supra note 21, at 24. When the Otto-
mans failed to take Vienna in 1683, Europe realized its relative strength and took the offensive
both militarily and ideologically. See id. The economic decline that had destabilized the institu-
tions basic to Ottoman rule set the system on a vicious spiral of deterioration that sucked the
statesmen of each century into the vortex at each attempt to reform the corrupt institutions of the
empire. See id.
28 The reign of Sultan Ahmet III (1703-30) marked the beginning of secularism. Known as
the Tulip Era because of the sultan's spring festival of tulips that captivated the entire Ottoman
elite in a veritable tulip mania, this period saw a relaxation of moral restrictions and intellectual
awakening. See BERKES, supra note 21, at 27; 1 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 235; KINROSS,
THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 377-79. During this era, the Ottomans became more
aware of European achievements, particularly the printing press, and realized that the Islamic
heritage and traditions proved inadequate to meet the conditions of the modem world. France
alone among the Western European countries provided an ally and mentor for the Turks, and it
continued to represent the epitome of Westernization in Turkish eyes until the present century.
BERKES, supra note 21, at 25-26, 39-40. Turkish military defeats and the threat posed by Peter the
Great in Russia prompted debates as to whether adopting European military institutions would be
permissible, or whether innovation even in one area would harm the unity of the whole structure
of society. Id. at 30-31.
29 While reformers struggled to modernize the military institutions, which had entirely col-
lapsed by the end of the eighteenth century, both the military and ulema realized the threat to their
status if reforms succeeded. Moreover, the impoverished social classes wished to maintain the
status quo on religious grounds and because they feared that their industrial products for the war
effort would become obsolete. KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 361-63.
Equally important was the sentiment that the reformers were emulating the ways of the infidel:
Religious resistance to change by these early Ottoman conservatives gave rise
in the West to the view-which in time became an established conviction-
that East and West were fundamentally dissimilar, that civilization was a
purely occidental creation, and that non-European races were incapable of
progress because of their superstitious religions. We thus find a strange con-
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Throughout the decline of the empire, the modernization debate focused
on whether the solution to the social and economic problems of an Islamic soci-
ety lay in incorporating Western methods or whether the solution demanded a
return to a stricter adherence to the traditions of Muhammad and his followers. 30
fluence between the attitude of Europeans and that of their Muslim adversar-
ies, both of which were in opposition to the spirit of the Tulip Era.
BERKES, supra note 21, at 52-53.
30 A long and costly war with Russia during the late eighteenth century reversed all the re-
formers' gains of the Tulip Era, but it convinced them of the need to adopt Western military tech-
niques. See STANFORD J. SHAW, BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW: THE OT-roMAN EMPIRE UNDER
SELIM I1: 1789-1807, at 21-25 (1971); ALAN PALMER, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OTrOMAN
EMPIRE 48-51 (1992); 1 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 251. Conservative reactionaries resisted
such efforts, denouncing and killing one reform-minded vizier as "an enemy of the sheriat and the
state." BERKES, supra note 21, at 67 (citing I.H. Uzuncarsili, Sadrazam Halil Hamat Pasa, 5
TURKIYAT MECMUASI 246 (1935)).
After the conclusion of an unfavorable treaty with Russia in 1792, Sultan Selim III initiated
a series of reforms known as the New Order (Nizam i-Jedid), which used France as a model for
reforming both civil and military institutions. See, e.g., KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES,
supra note 19, at 418. The new "cult of reason," the separation of the religion from the state
structure, struck terror into the hearts of traditionalists who saw the appeal of the French propa-
ganda in their country:
It is well known that the ultimate basis of the order and cohesion of every state
is a firm grasp of the roots and branches of holy law, religion, and doctrine;
that the tranquility of the land and the control of the subjects cannot be en-
compassed by political means alone; that the necessity for the fear of God and
the regard for retribution in the hearts of God's slaves is one of the unshakably
established divine decrees; that in both ancient and modem times every state
and people has had its own religion, whether true or false. Nevertheless, the
leaders of the sedition and evil appearing in France, in a manner without
precedent, in order to facilitate the accomplishment of their evil purposes...
have removed the fear of God and the regard for retribution from the common
people, made lawful all kinds of abominable deeds .... and thus prepared the
way for the reduction of the people of France to the state of cattle.
BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 64-67 (2d. ed. 1968) [hereinafter LEWIS,
EMERGENCE] (quoting Cevdet, 6 TARIH 394 ff. (quoting Ahmet Atif Efendi)). Lewis notes that the
hostile allusions to the French revolution may be a measure of its success. Id. at 68-69.
The conservative reactionary forces (military, religious, and feudal chieftains) instigated a
revolt that deposed Selim III in 1807. See BERKES, supra note 21, at 72-75, 81-85. Selim's
brother Mahmoud II continued the reform efforts with more success: He couched his ideas in
terms of restoring the glory of Suleiman I's reign by defeating the infidel, and he realized that
reforms must encompass the whole of Ottoman society. See 2 SHAw & SHAW, supra note 20, at 1-
19; KINROSS, THE OTrOMAN CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 437. Perhaps most importantly to the
success of his efforts, he forcibly eliminated the Janissaries, the highly trained military corps that
had thwarted many reformers in the past. 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 14-21; KINROSS,
THE OTrOMAN CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 453-57; PALMER, supra note 30, at 90-93. He also
undermined the ability and effectiveness of the ulema to resist change by reducing religion to a
department of state, instituting a Ministry of Education to oversee the mosque schools, creating a
Ministry of Justice to issue authoritative opinions of Muslim jurisprudence (fetvas), bringing the
religious charitable foundations (evkaj) under state control. See KINROSS, THE OTIOMAN
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By the late nineteenth century, groups of young reformers began agitating for a
constitutional government and assembly of the people's representatives.3 To-
ward the end of the sultanate, the economic and moral bankruptcy provoked
even more intense conflicts along these lines.
32
CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 460; BERKES, supra note 21, at 98-99; LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra
note 30, at 92-94.
As in the past, these reforms, which were continued by Mahmoud's son in the Tanzimat
Era, generated resentment among almost every sector of Ottoman society. Berkes attributes this
resentment to the fear that Christianity would triumph over Islam. The intimate involvement of
the European powers and European experts in implementing the reforms aroused rancor among
the people who still hated the barbarian infidel. BERKES, supra note 21, at 158-59.
31 For a thorough discussion of this Young Ottoman movement, see Serif Mardin, Libertarian
Movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1895, 16 MIDDLE EAST J. 169 (1962) [hereinafter
Mardin, Libertarian Movements]; SERIF MARDIN, THE GENESIS OF YOUNG OTTOMAN THOUGHT: A
STUDY IN THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKISH POLITICAL IDEAS (1962). Although the Young Otto-
mans favored Westernization, they felt that European powers had too much influence in the coun-
try. BERKES, supra note 21, at 206. They criticized the Tanzimat statesmen both for borrowing
extensively from European investors and for replacing Islamic institutions with Western ones
while failing to institute a set of checks and balances or give people the rights that corresponded to
the European institutions the Tanzimat reformers emulated. LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at
170-72. Significantly, the Young Ottomans believed that the democratic government they desired
must embody the principles of the sheriat--they would return to the spirit of classical Islam,
which "recognized the sovereignty of the people and the principle of government by consulta-
tion." Id. at 172-73.
The reformers succeeded in pressuring Sultan Abdulhamid II to promulgate a constitution in
1876, but this document did more to safeguard the sultan's privileges than to grant power to the
people. See KINROSS, THE OTrOMAN CENTURIES, supra note 19, at 511; 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra
note 20, at 174-80. Abdulhamid II also held the first elections in an Islamic state to establish a
representative assembly, but he dissolved it indefinitely in 1878 due to the audacity of the repre-
sentatives. LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 168-69; KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES,
supra note 19, at 530; 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 181-87; E.E. RAMSAUR, JR., THE
YOUNG TURKS: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1908, at 8-9 (1957).
The Hamidian era epitomized the conservative backlash against the secularizing reforms of
the Tanzimat. Three competing ideologies-the Islamic, the Ottoman, and the Turkish national-
ist-found followers among the subjects of the empire. Abdulhamid 11's reign was characterized
by a cultural dualism: The sultan and much of the populace expressed a desire to return to an
idealized Islamic past through a stricter enforcement of the sheriat, while others sought to reduce
the influence of religion by separating it from temporal values. Frustration with the European
powers fueled the shift in focus from West to East, and this anti-European sentiment prompted the
Ottomans to increase their ties with other Muslim countries. See RAMSAUR, supra note 31 at 11;
BERKES, supra note 21, at 259; 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 157-58 (noting the particular
influence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's ideas of uniting the worldwide Muslim community against
the West). Niyazi Berkes has attributed the failure of the constitution to three reasons related to
the increasing anti-European sentiment: (1) no precedent existed in any Muslim country for a
written constitution; (2) the existing constitutions in Europe were relatively new, and not much
experience in drafting them was available; and (3) the document was drafted under intense pres-
sures of international diplomacy caused by the "Eastern Question" crisis. BERKES, supra note 21,
at 223-24.
32 Many of the Young Ottomans escaped to Europe to publish revolutionary newspapers, but
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because the sultan had deprived the traditional estates of their power, such measures were ineffec-
tive. Mardin, Libertarian Movements, supra note 31, at 181-82. Ironically, the religious estate
itself wielded no real power during this period. In concentrating all real power in his own person,
Abdulhamid II empowered the bureaucrats to shore up their allegiance to his person while allow-
ing the ulema and theological students to "sink into poverty, obscurantism, and spiritual stagna-
tion." id. at 178-80. By promoting outward religiosity among the people through official support
of religion, Abdulhamid II effectively diminished its spiritual and political role.
The Hamidian regime effectively had paralyzed the intellectuals through a notorious espio-
nage network, and soon a revolutionary movement known as the Committee of Union and Pro-
gress ("CUP") gathered a fair amount of support among their number. See RAMSAUR, supra note
31, at 114-18. This group, comprised primarily of educated members of the lower classes, aimed
to re-establish the 1876 constitutional government and free the empire from European influence.
See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 263-64. In 1908, they succeeded in forcing the Abdul-
hamid II to reinstate the constitution and the assembly, but rather than preserving the empire as
they hoped, they in fact accelerated its demise. Id. at 273; LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at
214. Significantly, when the Young Ottomans reconvened parliament, they proclaimed Islam as
the state religion and recognized "a holiness in the person of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph."
MEHMET YASAR GEYIKDAGI, POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY: THE ROLE OF ISLAM 21 (1984).
From 1908 to 1918, the major ideological movements were Islamism and modernism.
Islamists were divided among themselves between a fundamentalist minority that strictly inter-
preted the sheriat and a moderate majority that supported pan-Islamic unity and wanted to mod-
ernize in a way commensurate with the sheriat. The modernists consisted of Westernists and
Turkists. Westernists ranged from radicals who wished to transplant everything from Western
civilization into the Ottoman Empire to moderates who wished only to import technology, a view
similar to that of the later Islamist moderates. Radicals advocated monogamy, closing of convents
and theological schools, liberation of women from the veil and from family matchmaking, eco-
nomic independence from foreign powers, and reform of the legal system. Id.; LEWIS,
EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 234.
The CUP faced a counterrevolution led by the theological students and the military. These
protesters called for the installation of a new government that would enforce the sheriat. The
CUP retaliated by inducing the Shaykh al-Islam to issue afetva deposing the sultan in favor of his
younger brother, Mehmet VI. LORD PATRICK KINROSS, ATATURK: A BIOGRAPHY OF MUSTAFA
KEMAL, FATHER OF MODERN TURKEY 44-45 (1964) [hereinafter KINROSS, ATATORK]; LEWIS,
EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 217.
Meanwhile, a Turkish nationalist movement sought to revive pagan religious heroes of the
pre-Ottoman period because it believed the adoption of Islam by the Turks had hindered their
progress. Although the movement was unsuccessful in reviving paganism, it led to "a speedier
and more drastic attitude toward the separation of church and state." HALIDE EDIB, TURKEY
FACES WEST 112-13, 119-21 (1930). The movement also stressed the unity of all Turkic peoples,
and focused on Anatolia as the symbol of the Turkish homeland. 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20,
at 261-64; BERKES, supra note 21, at 313-20.
Despite these secularizing forces, the 1908 constitution appeared to follow the Hamidian
regime's trend of returning to Islam. The laws under the Second Constitution would conform to
Islamic jurisprudence, and the sultan-caliph had the right to appoint the Shaykh al-Islam and safe-
guard canonical law. GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 21. The CUP did, however, accomplish sev-
eral Westernizing reforms: they modernized the army, reorganized the police, and completely
Westernized the educational system. EDIB, supra note 32, at 128-29. Most importantly, they
subjugated certain religious powers to the state authority: the increase of the authority of secular
courts over religious ones, state certification of religious judges, state employee status of religious
personnel, and the secularization of the marriage contract. GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 35; 2
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With his country at the brink of destruction through Allied secret trea-
ties after the First World War, Mustafa Kemal Atattirk ("Father Turk") heroi-
cally and successfully led a nationalist revolution and carved out a modem re-
public from the ruins of the "sick man of Europe." 33  After the Ottomans sur-
rendered to the Allies, Mustafa Kemal and a small band of patriots organized a
nationalist movement in eastern Anatolia to resist the dismemberment of the
Turkish heartland. He forged a compact state in Anatolia, allowing the Allies to
occupy the more distant provinces, and took control of the government. 34
Having freed the country from both the imperialist Western powers and
the cumbersome appendages of Ottoman territory, Kemal sought to free the
people from traditional customs. By using his personal charisma and his pres-
tige from the war years, he implemented a series of radical changes in society,
ironically using authoritarian methods to impose ideas of Western liberalism.
In Mustafa Kemal's view, Western culture had decisively proven itself
superior to Islamic culture; thus, in order to avoid defeat at the hands of a supe-
rior culture, Turkey would have to adapt itself to the superior societal traits of
the West. The Six Arrows of Kemalism-republicanism, nationalism, popu-
lism, reformism, 6tatism, and secularism--demostrate Ataturk's intention to
create a secular Western European country out of the heartland of the old Is-
lamic Ottoman Empire. Many of his supporters, however, did not share his
view for the new republic. Neither the arguments nor the ideas for reform were
original; Kemal and his cohorts simply adapted ideas that revolutionary thinkers
had developed decades previously.35
SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 306-07.
The CUP faced threats in parliament from rival groups, and a debate ensued between the
fundamentalist Islamists, the moderate Islamists, and the Westernizers. See LEWIS, EMERGENCE,
supra note 30, at 219-37. For a complete treatment of this debate, see BERKES, supra note 21, at
347-410. In the midst of these debates, the First World War erupted, and by the end of 1918, the
Ottoman Empire seemed ready at last to succumb to the vultures of Europe.
33 For a well-written history of this period, see generally KINROSS, ATATORK, supra note 32.
Sultan Mehmet VI (1918-1922) had asked the Allies for peace, and the Young Turk government
accepted the Allied-dictated armistice. See generally CLEMENT H. DODD, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY (1979); RICHARD D. ROBINSON, THE FIRST TURKISH REPUBLIC: A CASE
STUDY IN.NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1965). The armistice required that the Turks accept: (1)
severance of relations with the central powers; (2) demobilization of Turkish armed forces; (3)
Allied military control over Ottoman possessions in Arabia and Africa; (4) the right of passage
through the Straits for Allied vessels, and Allied occupation of all fortifications; and (5) the right
of the Allies to occupy any strategic point deemed necessary to ensure Allied security. The
Young Turk triumvirate fled the country immediately thereafter. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 15.
Although the government was generally discredited, some of its ideas were retained in the regime
established by Atatuirk. DODD, supra note 33, at 5.
34 See generally KINROSS, ATATURK, supra note 32. The Republic of Turkey gained diplo-
matic recognition of its sovereignty through the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1922. DODD,
supra note 33, at 6.
35 See discussion supra, notes 26-29.
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Republicanism. The first and most important arrow of Kemalism was
first embodied in the constitution of the republic in 1923: "The first statement of
this law cannot, by whatever means, be replaced or diverted-the form of gov-
ernment of the Turkish state is republican. 36 Atattirk's nationalist movement
convened a representative assembly in Ankara, which produced Turkey's first
constitution, ratified on January 20, 1921 .37 Atattirk ensured that the Grand Na-
tional Assembly had both legislative and executive powers over the objections
of those who favored a limited constitutionalism with the sultan at the head of
the government or opposed popular sovereignty altogether.38 This Assembly
also separated the sultanate from the caliphate, abolishing the sultanate, and
with it, the Ottoman Empire. 39 On October 29, 1923, the Assembly proclaimed
the Republic of Turkey, with Ankara as its capital, and AtatUrk as its president.
40
This executive and legislative organ would essentially stamp Atattirk's propos-
als with the seal of popular approval during his presidency.
Nationalism. The establishment of the republic marked more than a po-
litical break with the institutions of the Ottoman Empire, for at this time, nation-
alism was the dominant ideology-most of the non-Turkish population had
emigrated. 41 Turks had some difficulty comprehending the concept of national-
ism due to the competing viewpoints in defining the bounds of the Turkish
homeland. For the Ottomans, it was the perimeter of the empire; for pan-
Islamists, any territory where Muslims lived qualified; for pan-Turanists, home-
land was anywhere Turks lived.42 After the war of independence and the estab-
lishment of Turkey's boundaries as a geographical concept, coupled with the
emigration of minority groups, Turkish nationalism flourished. 3
36 Enver Ziya Karal, The Principles of Kemalism, in ATATURK: FOUNDER OF A MODERN STATE
16 (Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Ozbudin eds., 1981).
37 See Ilhan Arsel, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 22-23 (Tugrul
Ansay and Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1966).
38 See MUSTAFA KEMAL, A SPEECH DELIVERED BY GHAZI MUSTAFA KEMAL, PRESIDENT OF THE
TURKISH REPUBLIC 369-71 (1929); BERKES, supra note 21, at 439.
39 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 44-48 (explaining that this act responded to
the Allied invitation of both Turkish governments to attend the Lausanne conference).
40 Id. at 44-48. This body amended the constitution in 1924, still granting legislative and
executive powers to the Assembly, but also providing for the election of the president of the re-
public from among its ministers, through whom its executive function would be administered. A
Council of Ministers with a prime minister as its head advised the president and was responsible
to the Assembly for government policy. The president selected the prime minister and gave him
the power to appoint other ministers with his approval. Id. at 23.
41 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 42.
42 Karal, supra note 36, at 17-18.
43 Ali Kazancigil, The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism, in ATATURK: FOUNDER OF A
MODERN STATE, supra note 36, at 51 (noting that Atattirk's definition of nationalism as including
a territorial component resolved the dispute between the various interpretations and represents one
of his "major contributions toward the creation of the modern Turkish state").
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Populism. The very name "The Turkish People's Republic" reflects this
basic principle. The Republican People's Party ("RPP"), the single political
party, supported nationalism and republicanism, through which Atattirk believed
that the party would promote the spirit of populism.44 Ironically, while the Ke-
malists inherited the reforming traditions and ideologies of the nineteenth cen-
tury, they also inherited the Ottoman authoritarianiSm.45
Etatism. Etatism means "the participation of the state in economic af-
fairs."46 In the new republic, the state took the reorganization of the economy
into its own hands to provide stability, administering natural monopolies, such
as railroads and utilities, and certain services, such as banks.
4 7
Secularism. Secularism, the most significant reform, signifies freedom
of conscience and freedom of the political sphere from religious control. The
reforms of Atatirk entailed many outward expressions of rebellion against tradi-
tions that had long restricted individual liberties in the name of religion.48
Atatirk's abolition of the caliphate and secularization of the civil law radically
changed the relationship between religion and the state from its former fusion
during the Ottoman period.
Bernard Lewis notes that even during the War of Independence, "many
of Kemal's supporters certainly saw themselves as fighting for Islam against the
The Kemalists rejected the idea of pan-Turkism, but they adopted its argument that stressed
the Islamic and Persian corruption of the Turks. As Ziya Gdkalp explained: "[niation is not a
racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary group or association. Nation is a group com-
posed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the
same acquisitions in language, religion, morality, and aesthetics." ZIYA GOKALP, TURKISH
NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZAnON 137 (Niyazi Berkes ed. & trans., 1959) (emphasis
added).
44 When Atatirk organized the Republican People's Party, he expressed this sentiment:
The aim of a people's organization as a party is not the realization of the inter-
ests of certain classes over against those of other classes. The aim is rather to
mobilize the entire nation, called People, by including all classes and exclud-
ing none, in common and united action towards genuine prosperity, which is
the common objective for all.
BERKES, supra note 21, at 463 (quoting GAzI MUSTAFA KEMAL PASA HAZRETLERI IZMIR YOL-
LARtNDA (1923)).
45 DODD, supra note 33, at 56. During the later years of the Hamidian regime, the scope of
recruitment to the elite imperial bureaucracy had expanded to include military families such as
Kemal's own, and intelligentsia such as lawyers, journalists, and teachers. Id. Atatfirk's view of
popular sovereignty reflected much more the Jeffersonian sense of a political elite.
46 Karal, supra note 36, at 20.
47 Id. at 20-21. ttatism was also "social, ethical, and national" in the sense that workers
should have equitable income distribution, justice, and prosperity in the interest of national unity.
Id.
48 Id. at 22-23.
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unbeliever rather than for Turkey against the foreigner. ' 49 After the separation
of the sultanate from the caliphate, the caliphate continued to symbolize Islamic
solidarity despite the caliph's lack of temporal power. The Islamists agreed to
abolish the sultanate only because they had thought that the caliph would con-
tinue to function as head of state with his spiritual powers and would ratify all
legislation passed by the Assembly to verify their accordance with the sheriat.50
By 1924, some wished to install the caliph at the head of the Assembly to give
him temporal power, but Kemal argued that if the sultanate was anachronistic
for Turkey, then the caliphate was anachronistic for Islam.51 Moreover, the
Kemalists understood that they could never be free of the old regime unless Is-
lam were neutralized politically, and the caliphate functioned in the political
arena as a symbol to rally opinion against the reformers. Further, Kemal did not
want the caliphate to involve Turkey in international Muslim affairs.52 On
March 3, 1924, the Grand National Assembly deposed the caliph and banished
all members of the house of Osman from Turkey.53
The role of the sheriat had embodied the core of the relation between
religion and the state in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, and Atatijrk needed to
remove it as the basis of law to implement reforms that contradicted the sheriat.
On February 17, 1926, the National Assembly adopted a Civil Code adapted
from the Swiss Civil Code.54 Rather than incorporating parts of different tradi-
49 BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM IN HISTORY 224 (2d ed. 1993).
50 FEROZ AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 52-53 (1993) [hereinafter AHMAD, MAKING OF
MODERN TURKEY]. Halid6 Edib reports that contemporary circumstances would not have permit-
ted a Turkish caliph to lead all Muslims at that time because nationalist sentiment had already
divided the Ottomans from other Muslims beyond the point of reunification by a caliph. HALIDt
EDIB, TURKEY FACES WEST 204-06 (reprint 1973) (1930).
51 See EDIB, supra note 50, at 207; BERKES, supra note 21, at 450-54, 458-59. As a last resort
to preserve the institution, the position of caliph was offered to Kemal, who refused. See KEMAL,
supra note 38, at 685.
52 AHMAD, supra note 50, at 54.
53 Id. Halid6 Edib describes this event as the Islamic equivalent of the Christian Reformation.
EDIB, supra note 50, at 208-09. A corollary to the elimination of the caliphate was the proscrip-
tion on the use of Arabic in worship services as of February 6, 1933, a radical break with Islamic
tradition. GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 53. The reformers hoped to boost Turkish culture while
making the worship service more intelligible to the people, but the backlash for changing this
integral part of worship caused them to rescind the order. Id.; BERKES, supra note 21, at 488.
Similarly, the reformers made efforts to translate the Quran into Turkish because Kemal felt that a
translation would demystify the scripture. See GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 54; BERKES, supra
note 21, at 486-89.
54 The Code remains the foundation of Turkish civil law and "the keystone of the philosophy
of life of the Turkish society." SELAHATTIN S. TEKINAY, MEDENI HUKUKA GIRs DERSLERI
[LESSONS IN INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH CIVIL LAW] 37 (4th ed., 1984), quoted in Christian
Rumpf, The Importance of Legislative History Materials in the Interpretation of Statutes in Tur-
key, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 267, 270 (1994).
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tions, it established a new order to the exclusion of the old, stripping the ulema
of their administrative power and abolishing the sheriat courts.5
For full secularization of the state, Kemal found it necessary to curtail
the aspects of Islamic culture that pervaded society. He replaced the Shaykh al-
Islam with a President of Religious Affairs, whose duties included administra-
tion of the mosques, appointment of imams, administrators, maintenance work-
ers, and muezzins.56 He abolished religious schools, religious titles, closed
tombs of saints, and banned certain religious officials from wearing clerical
robes except in the performance of their duties.57
Significantly, the 1938 Law of Associations prohibited the "formation
of societies based on religion, sect and orders," though societies could be
formed for prayer or practice.58 This law also "prohibited political parties from
engaging in religious activities and from making religious propaganda., 59 Arti-
cle 163 of the 1926 Penal Code banned propaganda against the principles of
secularism, and Article 241 made religious leaders who spoke ill of the govern-
ment or the laws during the course of their duties liable for prosecution.
60
Teaching Arabic script in unauthorized schools was also a punishable offense
after the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928.61 In education, secular primary
school was compulsory until the age of 12. While no religious schools opened
to compete with the secular ones operated by the Ministry of Education, parents
could provide religious instruction privately or in group classes, provided they
met the qualifications for authorization by the Ministry of Education.62 Thus,
Kemalist secularism does not represent any real innovations in distinguishing
religion from state; rather, it simply banned all vestiges of religion from the pub-
lic square.
Revolutionism. Revolutionism embodies the continual need for the ref-
ormation of principles in light of new discoveries and changes in society. It,
too, supports the idea of the secular state, for if new scientific discoveries are
always allowed to change society, then one need not fear the control of religious
63traditions.
In light of this viewpoint, Atatiirk instituted a series of 'cosmetic' re-
forms in Turkey to accustom the people to the Westernized secular society he
55 ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 76-77; see also BERKES, supra note 21, at 467-73.
56 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 43.





62 Id. at 466-67.
63 See Karal, supra note 36, at 23-24.
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had created and to break their traditional habits.64 First, he passed the "Hat
Law" of 1925, which prohibited the wearing of the fez, a symbol of superstition
and prejudice in the eyes of reformers. Second, he outlawed the wearing of
veils for women who were teachers, students, or family members of government
employees at public functions. Third, he adopted the Latin script instead of
Arabic to facilitate literacy.65 Fourth, the training of religious personnel was
relegated to specialized university departments. 66 Finally, Kemal encouraged
every family to take a surname and declared Sunday a weekly holiday.67 This
series of sweeping societal reforms did not achieve secularism in the American
sense of separation of religion from the state, nor did it aim to eradicate all
traces of Islam from society:
Religion was guaranteed freedom and protection so long and in-
sofar as it was not utilized to promote any social or political
ideology having institutional implications. In such terms, to
understand the Kemalist secularism as a matter of separating
church and state is also erroneous and irrelevant. To put it in a
nutshell, Kemalist secularism was nothing but rejection of the
ideology of the Islamic polity.
68
These radical reforms were designed "to create a citizenship, with indi-
viduals freed from the weighty communitarianism constraints of the fimmet,
active within a contractual and pluralist civil society, and within a cultural arena
64 See BERKES, supra note 21, at 474-76; GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 50-51. Berkes notes
that "the traumatic nature of the change made it, unconsciously, a mass reaction against the tradi-
tionalists and conservatives, who for the first time felt utterly powerless." BERKES, supra note 21,
at 474.
65 This move posed a difficult political issue for three reasons: (1) Albanian Muslims who
were thought to be outside Islam used the Latin script; (2) use of the Latin script would signify to
the Islamic world that the Turks had adopted Christianity; and (3) Latin script was considered
unsuitable for expressing Turkish, and many feared that past literary works would be lost.
BERKES, supra note 21, at 474. A point in favor of the adoption of the Latin alphabet was that the
Caucasian Turks had recently done the same thing-following this precedent would facilitate
communications between the nations. See GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 50-51. Arabic script was
banned from public documents after December 1, 1928. BERKES, supra note 21, at 476.
66 Since the medreses had been closed, the Ministry of Education had opened schools for the
training of ministers, and the University of Istanbul opened a Faculty of Divinity. After the clause
proclaiming Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution in 1928, religious
courses were dropped from the school curriculum, as we were courses in Arabic and Persian.
These were relegated to specialized university departments. BERKES, supra note 21, at 477-78.
67 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 49. Kemal was given the surname Atatirk
at this time. Id.
68 BERKES, supra note 21, at 499. Atatirk favored a view popular at the time among Turkish
historians that the Turks had the most affinity with the unorthodox varieties of Islam whose mystic
sects and literature had provided outlets for national culture. Id. at 500-03.
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no longer structured by religious faith, but by reason and science. 6 9 In some
respects, however, the authoritarian methods by which the Republican People's
Party implemented reforms in fact prevented the very goal of democratic society
that the party leaders wished to achieve. Because of the government's not un-
substantiated fear of civil disorder, Atatirk and his followers tended to stifle
debate in the interest of maintaining a united front.70 Although one might fault
these early reformers for their less-than-democratic methods, one must remem-
ber that earlier attempts at popular sovereignty failed precisely because that
government could not agree on a program or a platform even though the mem-
bers had the same basic goals.7' Atatirk left a legacy of democratic machinery
in place in Turkey, but his legacy also included an example to army leaders that
the military is above politics and can intervene in the democratic process at any
time to save the country. The reformists' extreme measures, though perhaps
necessary in such a revolutionary context, did not settle the question of relig-
ion's role in the body politic to the satisfaction of the more conservative mem-
bers of Turkish society.72
IV. MULTIPARTY POLITICS, 1946-1980
As political parties facilitated social mobilization, people grew insecure
about their place in a rapidly changing world and clung to their familiar reli-
gious beliefs for comfort. 73 This struggle between comfort and change domi-
nates Turkish politics to this day, but in the early period of multiparty politics,
the bitter clash of the old and new civilization illustrates the difficulties of a new
democracy trying to reach beyond its cultural attitudes.
69 Ali Kazancigil, Democracy in Myslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective, 43 INT'L
Soc. Sc. J. 343, 350 (1991).
70 Atatiirk's strong charisma and personality would have made any attempt to form an effec-
tive opposition party to his own difficult, and indeed, he used his power to annul the first two
opposition parties. See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 380-84. The first opposition, the Pro-
gressive Republican Party, advocated maintaining the caliphate, free enterprise, and foreign capi-
tal. Atatfirk thought it dangerous to have political divisions at such a critical juncture. See id.
Kemal himself started the Free Republican Party in 1929, but when the religious reactionaries and
communists flocked to the party, the resulting chaos convinced Kemal that the country could not
yet handle multiparty democracy, and he dissolved it in 1930. See id.
71 See discussion supra nn. 31-32.
72 After Atattirk's death in 1938, Ismet Inbnoi succeeded him as president of the republic by
decision of the National Assembly. He followed the broad lines of Atattirk's policy, but he
showed more tolerance to the practice of religion by allowing the publication of the Turkish ver-
sion of the Encyclopedia of Islam, reinstating religious instruction in the elementary schools, and
establishing a faculty of theology. GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 65. In other areas, such as the
Hat Law, the adoption of Latin script, the Turkish call to prayer, and participation in illegal der-
vish orders, he enforced even more stringent penalties for violators. Id.
73 See Serif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, in ATATUJRK, FOUNDER OF A MODERN
STATE, supra note 36, at 191-220.
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A. Era of the Democrat Party, 1950-1960
After the founding of the Democrat Party ("DP") in 1946, a heteroge-
nous mixture of social groups that had been disappointed by the Kemalist plat-
form flocked to join. Both the communist left and the fascist right mobilized to
take over the party, but neither succeeded.74 The DP's founders were largely
drawn from the same socioeconomic classes as their RPP competitors, but they
were younger, had less legislative experience, had a lower percentage of univer-
sity-educated deputies, and had fewer members with bureaucratic or military
training.75 Generally, they were more economic and professional and less offi-
cial in occupation, and thus, more inclined to seem attuned to the interests of the
emerging middle class and the villagers.76
Even though the founders of the DP were secularists, Article 14 of the
DP platform stated that the party rejected interpretations of secularism that led
to a hostile attitude toward religion and advocated a separation between religion
and state that prevented the government from interfering in religious affairs.77
The Democratic Party assumed the reins of government in 1950 after twenty-
seven years of authoritarian RPP rule, and its success enabled the vigorous de-
bate over the role of religion in Turkish public life to thrive once more.
1. Religious Education
From 1946-1950, when the Democrat Party was in opposition, it insti-
gated debate in the Assembly over the role of religion in state-sponsored educa-
tion. In December 1946, two conservatie deputies suggested that reintroduc-
tion of religious education into the public schools would "strengthen spiritual
resistance against the threat of communism., 78 The value of Islam as a means to
combat leftist ideology cannot be underestimated in the view of religious con-
74 AHMED EMIN YALMAN, TURKEY IN MY TIME 222-27 (1956).
75 FREDERICK W. FREY, THE TURKISH POLITICAL ELITE 350-51, 380-81 (1965).
76 YALMAN, supra note 74, at 227.
77 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 69 (citing TARIK ZEFIR TUNAYA, TORKIYE'DE SIYASI PARTILER
(1859-1952) [POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (1859-1952)] 662 (1952)). The party gained support
in rural areas among those who favored revocation of certain secularizing reforms because many
villagers simply assumed that the Democrats opposed the RPP on all issues. FEDERAL RESEARCH
DivISION, supra note 27, at 55.
78 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 66 (quoting G. JASCHKE, DIE TURKEI IN DER JAHREN 1942-
1951 [TURKEY IN THE YEARS 1942-19511 68 (1955)); see also KEMAL H. KARPAT, TURKEY'S
POLITCS: THE TRANSITION TO A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 276-77 (1959). In the words of conserva-
tive representative Baha Pars, "Consciences are like countries and if you leave them defenseless,
the enemy will invade them. Our best defense against dangerous ideologies is to spread our own
belief." GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 66. The rebuttal argument, phrased by secretary general of
the RPP Recep Peker, stated that "using religion as a means of defense resembles the idea of try-
ing to cure a fatal poison by taking another poison which is not less fatal." Id.
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servatives. Moreover, the Islamic apologists envisioned closer ties to the Arab
world, a more "progressive" approach to the role of religion in public life, and
financial support for the clergy.79 The moderates defended Islamic education as
a right of the individual, but they regretted that in freeing the state from subor-
dination to religion, religion had become bound to the state. In the moderate
view, both conceptions violated the principles of secularism. They sought to
conform the government to the needs of society in allowing religious liberaliza-
tion, and they criticized those who detected reactionary movements in all reli-
gious practice. The secularists continued to consider any concession to religion
as a regressive step and feared such concessions would eventually allow Islam
80to regain control over society.
Ultimately, economic development won out as a better defense against
communism than religious education, but the question of the proper method of
instilling moral values remained unanswered. Those who favored religious in-
struction argued that a scientific study of religion would help prevent the growth
of superstition and obscure interpretations. The opposition contended that
religious instruction "could be a danger in the hands of ignorant reactionaries,"
and would violate the secular structure of the government.82
Slowly, religious instruction crept back into Turkish society. By Sep-
tember 1947, private religious schools were allowed to operate in accordance
with the regulations for other private schools, but such schools could use only
instructional materials provided by the Ministry of National Education, and all
instruction, including reading of the Quran, had to be in Turkish.83 By January
1949, optional religious courses were introduced for fourth- and fifth-grade stu-
dents as a supplemental instruction after school. Parents had to submit a written
request for the student to join the class, and the lessons were based on a book
published by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. 84 This compromise provided
a non-coercive alternative to adding religious instruction to the required curricu-
lum, but it made no strides toward a separation of religious affairs from the gov-
ernment.85 Despite popular opinion that these concessions to religious education
79 KARPAT, supra note 78, at 276-77 (citing VATAN, Aug. 5, 1947 and Feb. 11, 1949 (inter-
view and statements by H.S. Tanridver)).
80 Id. at 277 (citing VATAN, Feb. 16, 1949; Ali Fuad Basgil, DIN VE LAIKLIK [RELIGION AND
SECULARISM] (1955)).
81 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 66-67 (citing M. Tuncer, YENI ASIR, Feb. 4, 1948; C. Baban,
TASVIR, Jan. 31, 1948; K. Kafli, YENI SABAH, Dec. 3, 1953). Those favoring publicly sponsored
religious instruction argued that the absence of religion "prepared a ground that was fertile for
ideologies that might be hostile to republican Turkey." Id.
82 Id. at 67 (quoting R. Ogan, YENI SABAH, Dec. 13, 1948).
83 LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 418-19; GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 67.
84 LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 418-19; GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 67.
85 In higher education, the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara provided a secular alternative to the
old medrese system, creating "a teaching institute which carries on research in an objective man-
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marked a return to Islam, the manner in which they were implemented remained
entirely consistent with secularism. They did, however, reflect the opinions of
politicians and the vast majority of the people that secularism under the RPP had
been excessive.
86
2. The Liberalization of Secularism
Both external and internal pressures contributed to facilitating the
change to a more democratic party system: external pressure from the United
States to liberalize the economy and politics, and internal pressure from business
circles and large-scale farmers to share political power held almost exclusively
by the state elites.87 Whereas in the Ottoman Empire, political power had been
concentrated in the hands of a strong central bureaucracy, challenged by the
provincial notables and practically irrelevant to the peasantry, the Democrat
Party platform succeeded in attracting these peripheral elements to participation
in the governing process.88
After the DP gained control of the government in the 1950 elections, it
continued the more relaxed view of secularism in which religion could not play
a part in the political or legislative process, but freedom of conscience was up-
held.89 The theory of secularism did not change, but the formulation and im-
plementation of policy marked certain differences.
90
In response to the liberalization of restrictions on religious worship and
practice, mosque attendance rose, many religious books and pamphlets were
published, and an increasing number of Turks made the pilgrimage to Mecca. 91
As improved infrastructure gave villagers better access to towns, more women
began to wear the veil.92 The religious revival was probably most supported by
the artisans and small shopkeepers in the towns, who tended to have fanatical
leanings and connections to dervish lodges. The merchants, like the supporters
ner on the historical, sociological, and intellectual development of all religions." Howard Reed,
The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara , 46 MUSLIM WORLD 295, 295-312 (1956); see also Howard
Reed, The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara I, 47 MUSLIM WORLD 22, 22-35 (1957).
86 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 69.
87 Kazancigil, supra note 69, at 351.
88 Serif Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?, 102 DAEDALUS 185,
185 (1973).
89 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 74.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 77-78; LEWIS, EMERGENCE, supra note 30, at 416-24; 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20,
at 409- 10.
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of compulsory religious education, wished to preserve tradition as insurance
against communism.
93
The new government expressed the religious views of the people by al-
lowing the call to prayer to be recited in Arabic in 1950.94 Radio Ankara began
broadcasting Quran recitations in both Arabic and Turkish for ten minutes in the
morning and evening. Religious classes in the public schools became required
unless the parents expressly requested that their children be exempt from par-
ticipation. The Institute of Islamic Studies in Istanbul was reopened.95 Reli-
gious instructors (hojas) in the villages received a salary from the government.96
Additionally, the DP encouraged private initiatives such as the building of
mosques and centers for religious instruction in an attempt to define secularism
in a way that did not prevent Islam from having a role in society.
Unfortunately, controversies between the secularists and Islamists grew
violent, and certain religious groups began to destroy the statues of Atattirk on
the grounds that Islam forbids the reproduction of human forms.97 At the DP
convention in Konya, a resolution was introduced to reintroduce the fez, restore
the veil, return to Arabic script, and reestablish the sheriat.98  These sorts of
reactionary movements seemed to justify Atatirk's fears of Islamic threats to
secularism, and an enlightened, progressive Islam envisioned by the moderates
to coincide with secularism did not yet exist in popular practice.
3. Decline and Fall of the Democrat Party
The DP responded by decreeing one to five years of hard labor as pen-
alty for manipulating religion for political or commercial interest. 99 In 1953, it
93 See id. at 77-78, 118-19.
94 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 77. Prime Minister Adrian Menderes justified this departure
from the will of Atattirk by claiming that whereas during the revolution such measures were nec-
essary to eliminate fanaticism, "today, it is no more necessary to take these measures which
wound the freedom of conscience. We, too, shall fight reaction and fanaticism." Id. (quoting YENI
SABAH, June 5, 1950).
95 Id.
96 JOE E. PIERCE, LIFE IN A TURKISH VILLAGE 88 (George Spindler & Louise Spindler eds.,
1964). Stanford Shaw notes that these religiously oriented measures had little effect in attracting
new supporters to the conservative banner; it only allowed religious reactionaries to assert their
influence. 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 409-10.
97 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 78.
98 KARPAT, supra note 78, at 287 n.53. Karpat suggests that the real danger was that the liber-
alization of religion came prematurely. Modernization had not yet penetrated even half of the
towns and villages; secularism had not yet been safely established. Thus, the Islamic resurgence
benefited only the "obscurantist, fatalistic type [of Islam] which has dominated the Turkish
masses since time immemorial." Id. at 288.
99 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 79 (quoting Law 6187 (24 July 1953)).
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passed the Law to Protect the Freedom of Conscience to prevent political use of
religion. °°
Menderes respected secularism, but favored religious free speech and
free exercise to inculcate moral values and retain a sense of tradition in the
midst of Westernization. Unfortunately, the members of the DP made poor eco-
nomic policy, and inflation and debt eventually undermined the economy.01 As
the economy worsened, the DP Islamist members increased religious activism to
distract the people from hard economic times. 10 2  The Democrats became ex-
cessively sensitive to criticism, and they used the army and police to suppress
opposition before the 1960 elections. 10 3 This abrogation of democratic princi-
ples caused open revolt and led to a military takeover on May 27, 1960, which
set the precedent for two other coups in 1971 and 1980.1°4 The military arrested
leading members of the government and imposed martial law without demon-
strable opposition.
105
B. The Committee of National Unity, 1960-1961
The armed forces took control of the government to preserve democracy
and intending to return the government to civilian hands as soon as possible.
1 6
Although the coup's stated goals were merely to extricate the parties from their
political impasse and to restore democracy in a nonpartisan fashion, the military
arrested all the DP members of parliament, closed the partisan Democrat press,
and prohibited all political organization outside of provincial and county seats
(which effectively excluded the 70 percent of the population living in villages,
an important DP base of support). 10 7
Contrary to popular expectations, the military did not restore the secu-
larism that existed before 1950, but it instead adopted an attitude favorable to
Islam in that it recognized religion as an integral part of the Turkish identity. 0 8
The majority of the members of the governing Committee of National Unity
("CNU") favored upholding the citizens' right to freedom of conscience and
worship, but they wished to prevent the manipulation of Islam by political par-
100 FEROZ AHMAD, THE TURKISH EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: 1950-1975, at 368-69 (1977)
[hereinafter TURKISH EXPERIMENT].
101 See Dwight J. Simpson, Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey, 19
MIDDLE EAST J. 141, 146-48 (1965); 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 408-09.
102 See AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 372-73.
103 2 SHAw & SHAW, supra note 20, at 413-14.
104 Id.
10 Id.
106 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 57.
107 RICHARD D. ROBINSON, THE FIRST TURKISH REPUBLIC 25 8-59 (1965).
108 AHmAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 373-75.
[Vol. 105
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/5
SEPARATION OF MOSQUE AND STATE
ties and interest groups, ironically by making Islam a national instrument of the
state. 109
As promised, the CNU restored government to civilian political parties
in the elections of 1961 in accordance with the new constitution. The 1961
Constitution of the Second Turkish Republic made several significant changes
in the operation of the government. First, it transformed the Grand National
Assembly from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature." 0 This reform aimed at
limiting the "virtually unlimited possibilities of dictatorship over the legislative
process through control of the majority party.' '. It established a Constitutional
Court whose fifteen members review the constitutionality of laws and by-laws
of the Grand National Assembly." l2 The new constitution guaranteed certain
civil liberties and instituted judicial review." 3 Most importantly for this discus-
sion, Article 19 guaranteed freedom of religious faith and worship and freedom
from abuse of one's religion by others.' 1
4
C. Religion and Political Parties, 1961-1970
The Second Turkish Republic represented a marked change from the
previous era in political activity. Parties still paid homage to aspects of Kemal-
ism in their rhetoric, but the original Six Arrows were reinterpreted for a new
generation in sharp contrast with Atatirk's original intent. The village vote
began to dominate the electorate as the largest percentage of the voting popula-
tion, and politicians tailored their interpretation of secularism to appeal to these
more traditional sectors." 5
Islam in the 1960s acquired an "anti-liberal, anti-socialist dimension" to
combat socialist and leftist activities, especially among the privileged classes
109 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 89. Cemal Giirsel blamed Arab and Persian influences for
Islam's association with backwardness. The CNU retained the religious educational institutions
developed in the 1950s in the hope that better religious instruction would correct such misunder-
standings, and the military leadership provided for the repair and restoration of mosques as well as
the translation of the Koran into Turkish in accordance with this goal. AHMAD, TURKISH
EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 374-75.
110 Arsel, supra note 37, at 30-33. The legislature consisted of a National Assembly, which had
450 deputies elected based on their party's percentage of the vote in each province who served
four-year terms, and a Senate of the Republic, which had 15 presidential appointees and 150 sena-
tors who served six-year terms (with one-third elected every two years). Id.
II WALTER F. WEIKER, THE TURKISH REVOLUTION, 1960-61, at 77 (1963) [hereinafter WEIKER,
TURKISH REVOLUTION].
112 2 SHAw & SHAW, supra note 20, at 416-17; WEIKER, TURKISH REVOLUTION, supra note Il l,
at 78-79.
113 WEIKER, TURKISH REVOLUTION, supra note 111, at 80.
14 2 SHAw & SHAW, supra note 20, at 418.
115 BINNAZ TOPRAK, ISLAM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY 79-90 (1981).
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who used this ideology to maintain their status.1 16 The armed forces, the intelli-
gentsia, the RPP, and major entrepreneurs who wished to reduce inequalities in
education and income responded by "denying the existence of the communist
threat in Turkey."
'' 17
Although new minority parties representing every sort of extreme view-
point sprang up, the two dominant parties during this period were the Republi-
can People's Party, led by In6nui followed by Bilent Ecevit, and the Justice
Party ("JP"), led by Suileyman Demirel. u 8 The RPP touted its program to send
pilgrims to Mecca as evidence against accusations of atheism when Ecevit
shifted its policies to the left." 9 The Justice Party's program centered mainly on
strengthening capitalism, but individual politicians tended to appeal to religion
rather than economics in their campaigns because of the strong rural base of
support. 1
20
After 1965, when the Justice Party won a majority outright, the left-
right ideological cleavage shifted. Instead of secularism controlling the debate
over policy, political discussions now merged religion with ideology, such as
where religious conservatives attacked the RPP not only for anti-religiosity but
for communist sympathies as well. 12 1 The Justice Party courted religious con-
servatives by enlisting traveling preachers to campaign for them and by making
the free exercise of religion a major campaign theme. 122 The military distrusted
the Justice Party because of its roots in the Democrat Party, even though
Demirel had taken a strong law-and-order line and increased defense spend-
ing.' 23 The growth of extremism on both right and left hampered his efforts to
develop a market economy and individual freedom in both social and economic
activity. 124
Liberalization of religion and the press during the 1960s in some re-
spects realized Atattirk's worst fears. Turkish society became increasingly po-
116 AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 376. KomUnist and Moskof replaced
"atheist" and "infidel" as derogatory terms for radicals, while those who favored capitalism were
labeled Mason and Sionist. These terms had religious connotations to the Turkish people as anti-
Islam. Moreover, because the government favored a strong anti-communist line, such monikers
became more difficult to combat. Id. at 376-77.
117 Id.
118 See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 61.
119 AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 377.
120 Id. The party manipulated religion particularly overtly in the 1965 elections, using the slo-
gan "We are right of center and on the path to God" to deflect conservative criticism that they
were "freemasons" (capitalists). Id.
121 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 93.
122 Id.
123 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 60; 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 426.
124 2 SHAw & SHAW, supra note 20, at 426.
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larized between the extreme right and the socialist left, and both extremes held
anti-American sentiments. 25  Muslim religious circles and ultra-nationalists
both blamed America for everything wrong in Turkey. 1
26
The religious conservatives used the liberalization of the press under the
new constitution to advance their beliefs. Apologetic literature attempted to
prove, through quotes from Western authors, that Western civilization stemmed
from Islamic civilization. Other apologists sought to demonstrate through quo-
tations that Atatfirk had been a good Muslim! 127 The increase in Islamic senti-
ments among the people, even among educated Turks, demonstrated the failure
of Turkish nationalism and Western civilization, the two pillars of Atatirk's
ideology, to fill "the spiritual vacuum created by the elimination of Islam."1
28
The radical left and right both advocated social justice, though for dif-
ferent ideological reasons. Violent street demonstrations and unstable political
conditions tended to underline the wisdom of Ataturk's vision of slow democ-
ratic progression while secularism took root. The growing religious character of
society, however, helped to bring about a balance between the absolute subjuga-
tion of religion to the state and the control of the state by the clergy. 129 By the
end of the decade, both major parties had adopted a more moderate stand on
religion generally, though politicization of religious issues continued to play a
key role in elections. 130
D. Rise of the Religious and Political Right
In 1969, Necmettin Erbakan left the Justice Party and started his own
political party that changed the modernization debate in Turkish politics. Er-
bakan's criticism of the approach to modernization adopted by the Turkish elite
"represents the first serious attempt in the political history of the Turkish Repub-
125 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 139-40 (noting that the Cyprus
crisis particularly inflamed public opinion because America appeared to side with Athens).
126 See JACOB M. LANDAU, RADICAL POLITICS IN MODERN TURKEY 26-27 (C.A.O. van Nieu-
wenhuijze ed., 1974). The Soviet press gleefully reported these sentiments. Id. at 27 n. 111.
127 Id. at 176-77; see also Bernard Lewis, Islamic Revival in Turkey, 28 INT'L AFFAIRS 38-48
(1952).
128 URIEL HEYD, REvIvAL OF ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY 25 (1968).
129 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 88. As Andrew Mango caricatured the liberal viewpoint:
Such are the fears and emotions of Turkish intellectuals on the subject of Is-
lam, that Mr. Demirel has only to say in a message (delivered on the occasion
of a public religious holiday) 'May God bless our nation and its endeavors' (or
a similar formula) for an educated Turk to see blood-stained fanatical der-
vishes lurking in dark corners.
Id. (quoting Andrew Mango, Purpose in Turkish Politics and Its Outcome, MIDDLE EASTERN
STUD., Vol. 3, No. 3, Apr. 1967, at 302).
130 id. at 91-94.
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lic to question the validity of that view." 131 He favored closer ties with Muslim
nations rather than with the West for several reasons: Turkey has a common
heritage with other Muslim nations; Turkey can have greater regional prestige in
an alliance with the East rather than with the West; and Turkey can retain its
social and cultural values only by resisting the allure of immoral Western enter-
tainment and fashion. 1
32
This nationalist, anti-imperialist approach gained Erbakan the support of
rural peasants, older voters, and marginalized members of society who favor a
religious basis for public policy. 133 The first incarnation of Erbakan's vision, the
National Order Party, was quickly dissolved for its blatant anti-secularism, but
the resurrection of his ideas in the National Salvation Party was more success-
ful.' 34 The National Salvation Party participated in coalition governments
throughout the 1970s until the military intervention of September 12, 1980.135
1. The Second Military Intervention
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Demirel government utterly failed
to control violent leftist demonstration, and rampant inflation fueled further
criticism from the opposition. 136 In 1970, three smaller parties that had previ-
ously cooperated with the Justice Party merged into the National Salvation
Party, an explicitly Islamist party that demanded political concessions for its
continued support of the government. 137 Other members of the Justice Party
defected to form a thinly disguised revival of the Democrat Party or resigned
and sat as independents. 138 So many members defected that the Justice Party
lost its absolute majority by 1971 and could not form a coalition. 139
The Justice Party's inability to govern, coupled with the country's social
unrest and economic distress, prompted the military to intervene once again on
March 25, 1971. General Faruk Gfrler presented a memorandum to President
Sunay demanding the installation of a "strong and credible government" in an
event known as the "coup by memorandum." Demirel resigned as prime minis-
ter in protest against the coup, declaring the memorandum as incompatible with
131 Id. at 104.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 105.
134 See id. at 97-99.
135 See discussion infra at Part IV.D.2.
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the rule of law. 4° The president formed a nonpartisan government with the
permission of the generals, but the government could not pass any reforms over
Justice Party opposition.1 41 By February 1973, the High Military Council issued
a "second memorandum" demanding reform measures and revisions in the elec-
tion laws and cautioning the Assembly against continued criticism of the armed
forces. 42 A series of unstable non-party governments followed until Demirel
formed a minority coalition in 1975.141 In this environment, the National Salva-
tion Party emerged as a significant third-party force until its dissolution in
1980.'44
2. The National Salvation Party, 1972-1980
During the 1970s, the National Salvation Party ("NSP") participated in
several of the coalition governments as a representative of the conservative reli-
gious faction. 145 Its participation in coalition governments between 1973 and
1977 gave it far greater influence than its numbers would suggest. 46 Binnaz
Toprak has observed that the political success of the National Salvation Party
demonstrated that religious interests influence voting behavior, that voting along
religious lines does not necessarily lead to religious obscurantism, and that the
political nature of religious interests should not cause alarm. 47 Although To-
prak's study of Turks who supported the National Salvation Party may sustain
this claim, the stated goals of these parties did little to alleviate the anxiety of
secularists who feared what they considered obscurantist movements.
a. The National Order Party: Erbakan's Initial Political
Platform
Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of engineering at the Technical Univer-
sity of Istanbul, had been a prominent member of the Justice Party but left the
party after unsuccessfully challenging Demirel for the party leadership in
1969.148 He established the National Order Party ("NOP"), whose policies on
religious education and secularism managed to avoid the prohibitions against
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 66.
143 See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 20, at 429.
144 Id.
145 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 96.
146 Id.
14" Id.
148 AHmAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 382-83; LANDAU, supra note 126, at 188.
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Islamic political parties through careful semantics.149 The party platform used
non-religious terms like "morals and virtue" and upheld social justice while
defending freedom of conscience, the need for religious education, and freedom
of action for the President of Religious Affairs and other religious bodies.
50
The NOP addressed Turkey's domestic problems in two categories: ma-
terial and spiritual. In the material sphere, the NOP criticized Turkey's depend-
ence on foreign markets, low per capita income and unjust distribution of
wealth, and poor economy that had led to dependence on foreign aid as prob-
lems that resulted in a loss of autonomy in foreign policy. In the spiritual
sphere, the party saw deficiencies in failing to educate the youth for national
ends, using curriculum that repudiated Turkey's own history, accepting the
West's worldview, and allowing the penetration of foreign cultural influences.
151
The party supported democracy, social justice, and rural development, but it
opposed population-planning and birth control as counter to the national interest
(and presumably Islam). Its "order" would abolish the Senate, reduce the num-
ber of seats in the Assembly to 300, provide for direct election of the president,
and overhaul education and the media to strengthen moral values.' 52 Erbakan,
"investing himself with the role of public censor," expressed his opposition to
Turkish involvement in the European Common Market, claiming that Turkey
should strengthen its ties with other Muslims rather than with a "Jewish and
Zionist organization" set up by "six Catholic states. 153  Although he disap-
proved of joining the EEC on religious grounds, he also feared that the large
European corporations would assimilate Turkey economically and culturally,
and he denounced the European Common Market as the product of a "new cru-
sader mentality."' 154 He preferred an approach that would allow Turkey to lead a
149 AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 382-83.
150 LANDAU, supra note 126, at 188-91. Landau further emphasizes that the party's stand on
secularism
affirmed that the party opposed any interpretation of secularism which might
be hostile to religion .... Probably the same positive attitude towards Islam,
and the desire to capitalize on religious feeling, which had moved the DP in
1945, moved the NOP in 1970. However, while in the DP's program, it had a
relatively inconspicuous place among 87 other points, in the NOP's program,
although one of 100 paragraphs, the approach to religion permeated the
document and gave the party as Islamic a character as the laws of Turkey
permitted. The omission, too, of any reference to Atatfirk in the NOP's pro-
gram was hardly accidental.
Id. at 190-91.
151 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 98.
152 LANDAU, supra note 126, at 192.
153 Id. (quoting Tekin Erer, KaV Yalan Sbyledi?, SON HAVADIS, Dec. 25, 1970).
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group of eastern nations rather than participate in the EEC as its weakest mem-
ber.
A key element in Erbakan's platform was that "the most important clari-
fication to be made in the Constitution concerns the clarity to be given to rele-
vant articles so that the limits on the freedoms and rights of thought and belief
can be established.' 56 According to his argument, clarification of these articles
would "eliminate.. . implementations which contradict the fundamental princi-
ples of the Constitution," in other words, interpretations that prevent the free
exercise of religion. 57 Erbakan particularly requested revisions of Article 2 and
Article 19 which specifically restrict religious exercise:
The terms national, democratic, secular, and social which make
up the characteristics of the State in Article 2 of the Constitution
should be clarified so that they are not implemented or inter-
preted in the opposite sense in practice. In this context, it is es-
pecially the term "national" which needs to be clarified. The
term "national" should be clearly defined in a way that denotes
a respect for all the moral values of our nation in the historical
and traditional sense.... Religion is the fundamental belief and
thought system of an individual. The freedom of religion, con-
science, and thought is one's freedom of expressing one's views
according to one's own beliefs and thoughts. To incriminate a
person on this basis is against the spirit and fundamental princi-
ples of the Constitution, especially paragraph 1 of Article 19,
and Article 20.158
Erbakan further threatened to close cinemas, theatres, ballet schools,
and football matches if he came to power. Feroz Ahmad believes that Erbakan's
open criticism of the secularist policies of the government seemed designed
155 In Erbakan's own words:
Turkey ought not be in the Common Market of the western states but in the
Common Market of the eastern nations. Turkey is backward in relation to the
westerners but advanced in relation to the easterners. If Turkey enters the
Common Market under today's conditions it will become a colony. Today the
Common Market resembles a three-story building. The American Jews live
on the top floor, the European workers in the middle. Now they are looking
for the lackey-janitor to live on the bottom floor. That is why they want to
take Turkey into the Common Market.
AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 382-83 (quoting CUMHURIYET, March 14,
1964).
156 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 122 (quoting NECMErTIN ERBAKAN, MILLI GOROS VE
ANAYASA DEGISIKLIGI [THE NATIONAL VIEW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE] 15-19 (1973)).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 122-23.
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intentionally to "attract the wrath of the public prosecutor," and he reports that
many cynics thought that the only function of Erbakan's party was to allow the
government to demonstrate its even-handed treatment in closing down both the
extreme right NOP and the extreme left Worker's Party. 159 This is exactly what
happened. The National Order Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court
for violating articles 2, 19, and 57 of the 1961 Constitution relating to secular-
ism and the Law on Political Parties' 6° by calling for "Revolutionary Relig-
ion."'161 The leaders, however, were not punished.
162
b. The National Salvation Party in Government
The following year, Erbakan resurrected his ideas in the form of the Na-
tional Salvation Party. Sileyman Arif Emre, ex-Secretary General of the NOP,
officially led the party, but Erbakan remained the controlling force behind it.
163
Although the intelligentsia initially ignored the party and viewed its members as
religious obscurantists hoping to resurrect an Islamic past, the National Salva-
tion Party's use of traditional religious symbols to mobilize support soon com-
manded their attention. 164 The NSP's radical Islamist ideology allowed the
party to distinguish itself from other small right-of-center parties and have
greater success.
165
In 1973, the National Salvation Party participated in elections for the
first time. Although it only received 11.8 percent of the vote and 48 seats in
parliament, its numbers were sufficient to require the RPP to include them in a
coalition government. 166 Because of its strategic position, the new party exerted
influence far beyond that which its number of seats would suggest. This ironic
combination of an Islamist party and the party of Atatirk found common ground
in a program of "social justice," which protected small businesses, favored state
ownership of natural resources, supported amnesty for prisoners whose crimes
were "motivated by conscience," and sought protection for the Turkish minority
159 AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 383.
160 Id. at 317 (quoting MILLIYET and CUMHURIYET, May 22 & 23, 1971).
161 LANDAU, supra note 126, at 188; AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 317;
WALTER F. WEIKER, THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY: FROM ATATJRK TO THE PRESENT DAY 138
(1981) [hereinafter WEIKER, MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY].
162 AHMAD, TURKISH EXPERIMENT, supra note 100, at 317.
163 Id. (quoting YANKI 130, Sept. 10, 1973, at 4-8).
164 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 125.
165 One progressive secularist party, the Unity Party of Turkey, claimed to represent the pros-
perous members of the Shi'i minority, but it won only one seat in one election in 1973.
GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 125.
166 Turker Alkan, The National Salvation Party in Turkey, in ISLAM AND POLITICS IN THE
MODERN MIDDLE EAST 83 (Metin Heper & Raphael Israeli, eds., 1989).
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in Cyprus. 167 The moral socialism advocated by this coalition coincided well
with the NSP's religious commitment to care for the members of the iimmet
(Islamic community) and to govern in accordance with the national interest. 168
The coalition, however, soon dissolved.
169
Demirel included the NSP in a series of unstable coalition governments
with the Justice Party and some smaller right-wing parties between 1975-1980.
These years were marked by unprecedented terrorism and inflation, and in the
economic and political morass that followed, the military intervened once
more. 1
70
c. Ideology of the National Salvation Party
The National Salvation Party program blamed the infiltration of West-
ern culture into the Ottoman Empire for the Turks' loss of power and influence
in global affairs. Claiming that Turkey alienated itself from its own heritage by
adopting Western culture without importing Western technology, the NSP pro-
gram proposed to reconnect Turks with their heritage as a great Muslim civiliza-
tion while using technology to accomplish social justice.'17
The NSP supported human rights, traditional moral values, industriali-
zation, and elimination of inequalities between social groups and provinces.
1 72
The program also supported secularism as a guarantee of "freedom of thought
and belief," but it argued that secularism "should not become the means of sup-
pressing those people who think and believe."'' 73 It did not, however, support
freedom of the press. The party believed that "the press is free as long as it
respects national, spiritual, and moral values," which would presumably coin-
cide with those the party supported. 174 Further proposals called for closer ties
with Islamic countries, education based on "modesty, morals, and virtue," reli-
gious education, establishment of a heavy weapons industry, prohibition of
population control, heavy industrialization with equal distribution of industriali-
zation throughout the country, employee and local community ownership of
167 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 69; AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY,
supra note 50, at 160-61.
168 DODD, supra note 33, at 93.
169 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 69; AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY,
supra note 50, at 160-61.
170 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 70.
171 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 100-01.
172 Alkan, supra note 166, at 85-86 (quoting MILLI SELAMET PARTISI TOZOGO VE PROGRAM art.
1-7 (1976)).
173 Id. at 85 (quoting MILLI SELAMET PARTISi art. 18).
174 Id. (quoting MILLI SELAMET PARTISI art. 19).
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factories, and prevention of "the importation of 'immoral and inhuman tenden-
cies' under the guise of tourism."
' 17 5
This program suggests that Erbakan's interpretation of secularism,
should he have the opportunity to implement it, would enforce adherence to his
viewpoint even as practitioners of traditional Islam had been subordinated to the
will of the state in the past. Although Erbakan raises a valid issue in suggesting
that Kemalist secularism infringes upon the free religious exercise of certain
believers, he fails in this instance to offer a fairer alternative.
Tirker Alkan's analysis of Erbakan's speeches in the Milli Gazete, the
semi-official publication of the NSP, sheds further light on Erbakan's political
and religious ideology. From 1973, when the paper was established, until 1980,
when the NSP was shut down, the categories of "Religion" and "Secularism"
seem to have decreasing importance in a quantitative analysis. 176 However,
Alkan notes that religious militancy increased over time, and he attributes the
high frequency of mentions of religion and secularism at the beginning to the
need to delineate the identity of the new party. 77 He raises an important ques-
tion: If the trend of focusing on political rather than religious issues had contin-
ued long enough, could the NSP have become a secular party for all practical
purposes? 178 To some degree, the NSP's successors have, in fact, secularized,
but generally not enough to avoid being banned.
In discussing religion and secularism, Erbakan reveals a fundamentalist
Islamic worldview:
The only source of truth is in Islam.... Studies show that 60-70
percent of all the existing knowledge is produced by Muslims..
• .Those [Westerners] who always look down on us and show
off got the methods of calculations from Muslims. . . .The
cleanliness that we witness in Europe is also taken from Mus-
lims. So that a European does not have the right to show off
and look down on us.... The foundations of all the present day
sciences are revealed in the Koran. Thus, the age we live in has
to keep to the ways of the Koran. We say that we are living in
the space age. There are so many verses about space in the Ko-
ran. As if it declares that the coming age will be the space age..
. Science, present-day science was originated by the Muslims.
Nobody should dare to boast of what there is in the West.
17 9
175 Id. at 85-86 (quoting MILLI SELAMET PARTISI art. 42, 66, 72, 75, 87-101, 126-27).
176 Id. at 87, table 5.1. Religion was mentioned 112 times in 1973 compared to only 16 in
1980; secularism scored 27 hits in 1973 and none in 1980.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 88.
179 Id. at 88-89 (quoting Necmettin Erbakan, Him ve Islam, MILLI GAzET, June 19-25, 1973).
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Erbakan stops short of calling for an Islamic state based on the sheriat
because such a statement would directly violate Turkish law, but the Milli Ga-
zete could more accurately reflect the true beliefs of Erbakan and the NSP be-
cause newspapers were not subject to the same restraints as political parties. As
the National Salvation Party gained strength in the Assembly, Erbakan grew
more comfortable expressing his admiration for such Islamic states as Iran and
Pakistan, and he used the Islamic revival in these countries as a model for NSP
strategies."' The Milli Gazete suggested that "an Islamic revival and 'shari'a
state' for all the Islamic countries" would soon come to pass and that "the Is-
lamic revival in Turkey, in Iran, in Pakistan, and in the other Muslim countries
are all interrelated."' 8' Another article sees Turkey as particularly suited to Is-
lamic rule because the Ottoman Empire had drawn its strength from Islam: "Our
country deserves this more than the others. Let us pray to Allah that those days
arrive soon." 182 In some instances, the paper stated the goal of Islamic rule in
Turkey even more forcefully: "Only when Islam infiltrates into and reigns over
all institutions, from the presidency to garbage collection, can we say there is
Islam."
183
Such statements contrast sharply with the party's official approach to
secularism at its establishment in 1972: Secularism should assure freedom of
conscience and protect religious worshippers from state oppression, and the
current restrictions on the rights of believers should be lifted.'" Over time, the
party grew more militantly anti-secular as these quotes from 1980 illustrate:
The political structure of the new Turkey contradicts the politi-
cal principles of Islam. Islam entails the unification of political
and religious powers under domination of religion. In this re-
spect, secularism and the secular system are against Islam,
shari'a and religion. Especially its application in Turkey is de-
signed to assure irreligiosity. 1
85
180 Id. at 89-90 (quoting MILLI GAZETE, Jan. 4, 1980).
181 Id at 90. (quoting Abdurrahman Dilipak, Iran Islam Cumhuriyeti, MILLI GAzETE, Mar. 7,
1980).
182 Id. (quoting Ahmet Nazim Tastan, Korkunun Ecele Faydasi Yok, MILLI GAZETE, May 7,
1980).
183 Id. (quoting Ahmet Saglam, Devlet Resmen Bir Dine Mensup Degildir, MILLI GAZETE, July
23, 1980).
184 Alkan, supra note 166, at 91.
185 Id. (quoting 4ETIN OZEK, TURKIYE'DE LAIKLIK, GELISIMI VE KORUYUCU CEZA HOKOMLERI
(1962) (quoting Mehmet Uludag, Laiklik Dine Karsi Degil Midir?, MILLI GAZETE, Mar. 8, 1980)).
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Those are the traitors and liars who say that politics and religion
are different things.... Muslims do not separate the affairs of
the world from the affairs of heaven.'
86
It becomes clear that man does not have the right to [pass] legis-
lation. If he passes laws or claims to do so, he sins against God.
...The creator of Islamic law is the creator of man as well.
God created men in accordance with these laws. Human laws
do not fit human nature .... Islam is the rule for all times. ... It
is both religion and state... the Koran has not been revealed to
be recited in graveyards or to be closed down in temples. It has
been revealed to reign.
87
The architects of National Salvation Party ideology viewed Islam as to-
tally incompatible with secularism and seemingly sought a return to the din-u-
devlet of the Ottoman era. Using arguments reminiscent of the Ottoman tradi-
tionalists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they proclaimed in their
literature the evils of Western influence. Despite their radically conservative
views, NSP politicians did not hesitate to advocate human rights and democracy
when it suited their purposes, even to the point of supporting freedom of thought
for "Communists and Leftists," 188 although the voting record does not substanti-
ate this rhetoric. In 1975, as part of the National Front government (the Justice
Party, the National Action Party, the Republican Reliance Party, and the Na-
tional Salvation Party), the NSP supported a government policy to discriminate
against the Alevis, a Shi'i sect, and the Kurds in southeast Anatolia.
89
The most important contribution of the National Salvation Party to po-
litical thought was its revival of the argument of the reformers in the eighteenth
century, that to adopt Western technology without its culture is not incompatible
with Islam. Because NSP leaders like Erbakan and his immediate circle had
technological training, they supported industrialization but with an eye toward
protecting the small artisans by inculcating the populace with Islamic morality.
Thus, they suggested that Islam may not present the barrier to progress that
Atattirk believed it did.190
186 Id. (quoting Necdet Kutsal, Islam Felsefe Degil, Bir Millet Insa Etti, MtLLI GAZETE, Mar.
16, 1980).
187 Id. (quoting M. Emin Demircan, Kelime-i Tevhid ve Islam Nizami, MILL GAzETE, Apr. 6,
1980).
188 Id. at 92 (quoting Necmettin Erbakan, 3. Bes Yillik Plan, MILLE GAZETE, Mar. 14, 1973).
189 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 167.
190 DODD, supra note 33, at 117. Dodd believed that these proposals would not be sufficient to
control such innovation, and that this position seemed untenable. Id.
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d. Supporters of the National Salvation Party
How well did the National Salvation Party's message of pan-Islamism,
anti-Westernism, and anti-Semitism resonate with the electorate? A 1973 elec-
tion poll in the national paper Milliyet revealed that 42.5 percent of NSP voters
supported it because it was a religious party,' 9' but at this time religious state-
ments were more frequent and less militant. Serif Mardin suggests that the NSP
appealed mostly to marginalized groups in society-those who are not assimi-
lated into the "modernist center."' 192 His stereotypical NSP supporter was a
small merchant or artisan, disgruntled by social and economic failure, who
turned to religion for a sense of identity in a rapidly changing world.193 Toprak
found in examining voter surveys conducted by the Political Science Faculty at
Ankara University that those who were 60 years of age and older supported the
NSP in greater numbers than other age groups. 194 Moreover, in a Milliyet sur-
vey, "[t]he NSP was labeled 'the least preferable party' by the majority of the
young people (21-30 category)."'' 95 Of those who held this opinion among all
age groups, 36.8 percent disliked the NSP's exploitation of religion, 18.2 per-
cent considered it "reactionary," but only 5.7 percent believed the NSP was
"anti-secular."' 96
One might predict that the NSP would do well among disaffected mem-
bers of society. Karpat's survey of political affiliations in gecekondus ("over-
night" squatter settlements of village migrants around Ankara and Izmir) re-
vealed a decided majority of these marginalized members of society preferred
the Republican People's Party and considered Inonui the most reliable and trust-
worthy political leader, 197 yet the NSP fared better in the polls in rural areas than
in the urban centers. 198 Most of the NSP's support came from the rural country-
side; in the ten administrative districts in which the NSP received the most
votes, none had a higher level of urbanization than the national average.199 The
conservative attitudes of the NSP naturally appeal to the traditional peasant vil-
lager concerned with preserving Islamic principles and account for the success
191 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 97 (citing MILLIYET, Oct. 9, 1973).
192 See id.at 105 (quoting Serif Mardin, Religion and the Turkish Social Transformation (1973)
(paper presented at the conference on "The Republic of Turkey, 1923-1973: Studies in Twentieth-
Century Nation-Building," The University of Chicago, December 1973)).
193 See id.
194 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 108 (citing MILLIYET, Sept. 29, 1975; Oct. 11, 1975).
195 Id. (citing MILLIYET, Oct. 9, 1973).
196 Id.
197 KEMAL H. KARPAT, THE GECEKONDU: RURAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION 219-24
(1976).
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of the NSP in the countryside. The preference of the gecekondu dwellers for the
RPP perhaps indicates their transition to urban life; the importance of religion to
an individual tends to vary inversely with the level of development.2°
Toprak's analysis of the backgrounds of the NSP candidates for office
reveals a different picture from its constituency. The majority of the party's
electoral candidates were young, professional, well-educated, and probably of
middle or upper-middle class in terms of income. These candidates do not fit
the category of "hav[ing] been adversely affected by modernization ....
Erbakan himself comes "from a notable provincial family" and his father was a
judge who was "an admirer of Atatirk. ' '20 2 Erbakan's shining academic per-
formance enabled him to attend the prestigious Istanbul Technical University,
and upon completion of his Ph.D., he received a grant to continue post-doctoral
studies in the Federal Republic of Germany. His subsequent career as a profes-
sor certainly qualifies him as a member of the Turkish elite. Erbakan differs
from the mainstream of Turkish elite, however, in his deep interest in religion.
A closer look at the forty-eight NSP members of the Assembly in 1973 reveals
that nineteen of these had backgrounds directly connected with religious asso-
ciations or had attended religious schools. Erbakan and the NSP as a whole
represent a new form of elite with a contrasting cultural orientation to that of the
more or less monolithic social group that had composed the elite since the foun-
dation of the republic.2 °3
The NSP emerged as the third strongest party in 1973, but it did not sus-
tain its initial level of support.204 By 1977, the number of NSP delegates was
reduced by one-half, but it remained the third strongest party.0 5 In that election,
both major parties had campaigned on a platform of eliminating coalition gov-
ernments and asked the voters for a mandate to govern alone, but the vote split
sufficiently between the JP and RPP as to still require the NSP for a coalition
partner.206 The NSP's initial rapid rise among the population indicates an estab-
lished base of support, but its declining percentage of a growing number of vot-
ers indicates that this support is stagnant, and, in the opinion of Tuirker Alkan,
the religious support could never have threatened the established secular sys-
tem.207 Walter F. Weiker agrees, and he predicted that because the NSP lost
several of its seats in 1977, voters supporting the radical right would increas-
200 See generally Frederick W. Frey, Regional Variations in Rural Turkey, CENTER FOR INT'L
STuD. REP. No. 4 (MIT, Cambridge, Mass.) 1966, at 17-20.
201 TOPRAK, supra note 115, at 107.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 107-08.
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ingly seek redress of their grievances with modernization through secular
means.20 8 The correlation between urbanization and secularism seems to sub-
stantiate this claim. As Turkey becomes increasingly urbanized through rural-
urban migration and through technological improvements (which the NSP sup-
ported), the percentage of likely religious party voters should decrease.
e. Civil Disorder and Military Intervention
Between 1977 and 1980, terrorism and political violence once again ran
rampant. Some sources estimate that as many as 2,000 died as a result of the
violence in the 1978-79 period.209 Demirel refused to risk the position of the
coalition government by allowing a full investigation into the terrorist activities,
so violence on the right increased, and leftist groups retaliated in the hopes that
state reaction would polarize the country and lead to revolution.210 In forming
the Second National Front coalition after the 1977 elections, Demirel made a
tactical error in associating himself too closely with the political right. Defec-
tions within the party over dissatisfaction with killings and oppression of the
Kurds in the southeast resulted in enough loss of support for Demirel for the
government to be defeated in a vote of confidence. Ecevit formed a coalition
with the JP defectors and other Independents, but he fared little better-fighting
broke out on the floor of the Assembly even as he read his program. 21 "In the
first 15 days of 1978, there were 30 political killings and over 200 were
wounded. ''21 2 In this polarized environment, even the police were divided along
political lines, making enforcement of the law difficult and keeping terrorists
under control impossible.213
The military generals once again plotted to reinstate stable government
both to eliminate political violence and to maintain Turkey's strategic impor-
tance to the West following the fall of Iran.214 Following a negative appraisal by
a U.S. State Department official that Demirel's failure and Erbakan's hostility
toward Washington rendered Turkey incapable of handling its regional role, the
generals decided once more to set the government on a stable course.215
Economic difficulties, continued terrorist activities, and political dead-
lock over the election of a president to replace Fahri Korutirk, whose term had
208 See WEIKER, MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 161, at 139.
209 See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 80.
210 See AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 168.
211 Id. at 170-71.
212 Id. at 171.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 174.
215 See id. at 175.
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expired in April, caused difficulties in parliament.21 6 Erbakan added to the po-
litical tension by staging a rally at Konya in which "religious fundamentalists
,,2 17demonstrated to demand the reinstatement of Islamic law ....
On the evening of September 10, General Kenan Evren led a military
coup intended to strengthen reforms of the previous interventions. It met with
little resistance, and many viewed it as the only alternative to anarchy.218 The
constitution promulgated by this military coup has governed the country until
the present day.
The decade of the 1970s demonstrated the difficulties in forming a co-
hesive government with a proliferation of small political parties. Even though
the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party remained the clear favorites,
the fact that the conservative vote often split between the Justice Party and the
smaller parties enabled the National Salvation Party to play a key role in coali-
tion governments. Necmettin Erbakan's party offered a nationalist, anti-
imperialist alternative to the mainline parties, and its program of social justice,
traditional moral values, and industrialization won more support than the plat-
form of any other smaller party. Most significantly, the NSP platform suggested
that Islam does not necessarily present a barrier to progress. The party's radical
views on religion, however, alarmed secularists.
V. THE TRIUMPH OF SECULARISM?
The political situation from 1980 to the present day continues a long
evolutionary process toward resolving the debate over the proper role of Islam
in secular Turkish society. As Islam has grown steadily in importance to the
public sphere since 1923, it reached the pinnacle of its importance in politics
when its representation in the Welfare Party ("WP") emerged from the 1994
municipal elections as the strongest party in parliament. This amazing victory
for an Islamist party in Turkey both registered the level of discontent among the
voters with the major parties and reflected the divisions in the center-right.
Moreover, while establishment and Sufi Islam remain ambivalent toward the
WP and center-right parties, the parties in government have provided support for
religious activity, thus aiding the rise of political Islam and the fundamentalist
movements that are now challenging their support.219 Religious conservatives
have attained an increasing social acceptability in the government and civil ser-
vice despite the military's efforts to the contrary, and the Islamist Welfare Party
enjoyed remarkable success in a state where most people support secularism.
216 See id. at 179.
217 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 81.
218 Id.
219 See Sencer Ayata, Patronage, Party, and State: Politicization of Islam in Turkey, MIDDLE
EASTJ. 40, 52-53 (1996).
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A. Political and Economic Restructuring
The military intervention of 1980 was far more extensive than that of
1960 or 1971, and it also had more widespread support from the people.22°
While altering the government administration significantly, "it had no affinity
with the bureaucratic-authoritarianism of the South American type. It was cer-




The public welcomed the promise of stability offered by martial law af-
ter the rampant inflation, instability, and disorder. General Kenan Evren in-
formed the country in a radio and television broadcast that "'the Turkish armed
forces were forced to take over the state administration with the aim of safe-
guarding the unity of the country and the nation and the rights and freedoms of
the people... in other words, restoring the state authority in an impartial man-
ner.'
22 2
Evren set up a National Security Council consisting of commanders of
the branches of the armed services in order to replace the regular government
and executive bodies.223 He additionally dissolved parliament, suspended all
political parties and professional associations (such as trade unions), and initi-
ated legal proceedings against several party leaders.224 The stated goal of
Evren's interim government was the restoration of democracy in such a way as
to preclude the need for any future such interventions, but the military leaders
who claimed to preserve democracy planned to do so by distinctly undemocratic
means. 225 At a news conference on September 16, 1980, Evren implied that
extremist parties on the left and right would not participate in the political proc-
ess and that teachers promulgating values that the government deemed "un-
,, 226
democratic" could be purged. Politicians assumed to have corrupted the sys-
tem would be prosecuted on criminal charges.227 Perhaps these drastic measures
220 METIN HEPER, THE STATE TRADITION IN TURKEY 128-29 (1985).
221 Id. at 130.
222 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 181 (quoting Gen. Kenan Evren
Statement, Radio Address Broadcast (Sept. 12, 1980), in BBC, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, at ME/6523/C/1).
223 See id. at 181.
224 Id. at 182.
225 See id. at 183 (citing Gen. Kenan Evren, News Conference Address (Sept. 16, 1980), in
BBC, SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, at ME/6525/C/1).
226 Id. Evren stated that "'only those who believe in democracy are entitled to democratic
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seem harsh to American sensibilities, but they effectively decreased the number
of casualties from terrorist activities.
228
1. Religious Education
Although the regime strictly enforced restraints on blatant abrogations
of secularism, such as calling for a Koranic government, it promoted religious
education. 229 The Ministry of National Education cooperated with the Faculty
of Theology at Ankara University in preparing curriculum for compulsory reli-
gious courses, and teachers attended a training program prepared by the minis-
try.230 The courses were taught from the fourth grade through the completion of
high school for two hours per week and aimed
to provide students, in elementary and intermediate schools,
with knowledge on religion in general, the Islamic religion, eth-
ics and a sufficient basic knowledge, related to these, in line
with the Turkish national educational policy and its general
goals and principles as well as Atatfirk's principles of secular-
ism; thus, to strengthen from a religious and ethical angle,
Atattirkism (Kemalism), national unity and solidarity and hu-
manitarianism as well as to bring up ethical and virtuous human
beings.231
Prisoners also received religious education, along with literacy training.
This and the government's other adult literacy programs dramatically raised the
overall literacy rate "from 67 percent in 1970 to 75 percent in the first half of
1983.' ' 232
Generally speaking, the debate over the usefulness of teaching about re-
ligion as a means to inculcate morals and good citizenship had largely been set-
tled in favor of the religious courses. This new curriculum, however, marked a
break with the old quasi-compulsory Quran courses in that the state-sponsored
curriculum now taught about Islam from a secular perspective.233 The govern-
ment in effect legitimized Kemalist thought on the separation of religion from
228 ANDREW MANGO, TURKEY: THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW ROLE 24 (1994) (citing GEN.
SECRETARIAT OF THE SEC. COUNCIL, 12 SEPTEMBER IN TURKEY: BEFORE AND AFTER 253-59
(1982)). "In the two years before the coup, more than 5,000 people had been killed and 14,000
injured in terrorist incidents.... [E]ight months after the military takeover, the number of murders
dropped to 230 and injuries to 560." Id.
229 GEYIKDAGI, supra note 32, at 141.
230 Id.
231 Id. (citing HuRRIYET, Jul. 7, 1982, at 3).
232 Id. (citing Kenan Evren, Jun. 14, 1983).
233 HEPER, supra note 220, at 134.
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the state under the guise of promoting religion. 234 Moreover, by educating the
citizens about religion, it reduced the chances that they would be susceptible to
its exploitation, particularly during elections. 235
2. The New Constitution
In reorganizing the government, the military attempted to create a new
party system that would better reflect Kemalist ideology. A major portion of the
reforms contained in the new constitution pertained to electoral processes and
particularly addressed the need for fewer smaller parties.236 Evren, like Ataturk,
disapproved of any disorder in the political process and laid much of the blame
for the crisis of the late 1970s on the concessions the larger parties had made to
the smaller ones. 237 He singled out the National Salvation Party for particular
scrutiny, bringing Erbakan to trial. Evren sought to establish a system "in which
two centrist parties would compete in a 'responsible' fashion for the right to
19238govern.
The Consultative Assembly drafted three major pieces of legislation
during its term in office: the new constitution, the Law on Political Parties, and
the Law on the Election of Deputies. The constitution reiterates the commitment
of the Republic of Turkey to the principles of government by rule of law,
Atatiirk's nationalism, human rights, and national solidarity.2 39 As in many con-
stitutions, provisions affirm the sovereignty of the people and state the equality
of all persons before the law regardless of race, gender, or religious beliefs.240
However, in light of the political violence that took place before the military
intervention, the new constitution emphasizes that "[n]one of the rights and
freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violat-
ing the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, of endanger-
ing the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental
rights and freedoms ... or creating discrimination." 241 Despite these guarantees
of certain liberties, in times of war or martial law, partial or total restriction of
these liberties can be legally imposed, but even under such circumstances, the
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 See id. at 133-34.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 134.
239 TURKEY CONST. art. 2, reprinted in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds., 1994).
240 Id. art. 6; art. 10.
241 Id. art. 14.
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individual cannot be forced to reveal his religion, nor can his freedom of con-
science be violated.242
Article 24 covers the freedom of religion and conscience specifically:
Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious be-
lief and conviction.
Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be
conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provi-
sions of Article 14.
No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in reli-
gious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and con-
victions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious be-
liefs and convictions.
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be con-
ducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in reli-
gious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the
curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious
education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's
own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their le-
gal representatives.
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious
feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner what-
soever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for
even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, politi-
cal, and legal order of the State on religious tenets.243
Article 25 reiterates the freedom of thought and expression for every-
one,24 and Article 26 allows everyone to propagate his opinions through speech,
writing, or other means.245 These freedoms can still be restricted if considera-
tions such as state or professional secrets or confidentiality of the private life of
individuals apply. 24
Article 68 clarifies the role of political parties, stipulating that their pro-
grams cannot violate human rights, popular sovereignty, or democratic or secu-
242 Id. art. 15.
243 Id. art. 24.
244 Id. art. 25.
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lar principles.247 It prevents the formation of any parties that advocate the estab-
lishment of the domination of a group or class over the republic or of any type
of dictatorship.248 It further stipulates that "discriminative auxiliary bodies such
as women's or youth branches" may not be formed. 249 Another restriction on
party membership that seems directly aimed at preventing another chaotic social
situation is the prevention of judges and prosecutors, students, faculty, certain
civil servants, and members of the Armed Forces from joining political par-
ties. 250 Further restrictions on political parties and the election process were
enumerated in the Law on Political Parties and the Law on Election of Deputies.
The Constitution of 1982 was adopted in a landslide referendum vote.
With 95 percent of the voters participating, 92 percent voted for adopting the
constitution and for retaining Evren as president for the next seven years (one
full term). 25' Feroz Ahmad suggests that this overwhelming support can per-
haps be explained by the fact that a vote for the constitution was perceived by
the public to be a vote for civilian rule.252
The military officers drafted the constitution using the nationalism of
Atatuirk to reinforce the state tradition. The generals reinterpreted Kemalism
and resurrected it as Atatiirkism in official parlance, turning the thought behind
the original modernization program into an ideology that can be applied to any
253
occasion. Although they deviated from the original Kemalist platform in
supporting liberal economic reforms and adopting a more congenial attitude
toward religion, the overarching goal of the military regime was to create an
orderly society of educated citizens who participated in the political process.254
Their well-laid plans to produce stable and enduring democracy seemed im-
pregnable-until the government was restored to civilian control.
B. Turgut Ozal: Union of Religion and Progress
The 1983 general elections allowed the public to voice their preferences
for political parties for the first time under the new constitution. In their efforts




251 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 187.
252 Id.
253 Ahmet Evin, Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980, in STATE,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE MILITARY: TURKEY IN THE 1980s, at 201, 211-12 (Metin Heper and Ahmet
Evin eds., 1988).
254 See HEPER, supra note 220, at 147; Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, Officers: Westernization and
Democracy, in TURKEY AND THE WEST: CHANGING POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES 19, 32-
33 (Metin Heper et al. eds., 1993).
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to ensure stability, the military had attempted to prevent smaller parties from
participating and to restrict the contest to a center-left and a center-right party.
2 55
All members of the 1980 parliament were disqualified from political activity for
five years and all party leaders for ten years in order to prevent Ecevit and
Demirel from coming to power.256 The other leaders were not considered
threatening by this point.257 Of the seventeen parties formed, only a few had any
real influence: the Great Turkey Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Nation-
alist Democracy Party, the Populist Party, and the Motherland Party. 258 The
Great Turkey Party was an attempt by Demirel to resurrect the Justice Party, and
it was banned from the elections.259 The Social Democratic Party ("SODEP")
was led by Erdal inondi, son of ismet In6nui, and was targeted toward members
of the old RPP. 260 SODEP was not banned, but the NSC's ability to veto candi-
dates at will prevented its participation in the election. 261 The Nationalist De-
mocracy Party ("NDP") represented the right and had General Sunalp as its
leader; the military publicly backed this party.262 The Populist Party ("PP")
attempted to fill the vacuum on the left from the loss of the RPP and was led by
a former private secretary to Indni. 26 3 The Motherland Party ("MP") under
Turgut Ozal claimed to represent all the political tendencies in the pre-1980
period, but it actually occupied the center.264 The junta did not ban the Mother-
land Party,265 perhaps because Ozal had spearheaded a strategy to improve Tur-
key's economic position, and he had impressed the Western nations with Tur-
key's potential for growth and economic stability.266
Due to Ozal's stance against statist and bureaucratic policies and to un-
inspiring leadership in the other parties, the Motherland Party won the elec-
267tion. Even with the support of the popular President Evren and the imposition
of a fine on those who failed to vote, General Sunalp lost.268 Although the
255 MANGO, supra note 228, at 25.
256 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 187.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 187-89.
259 Id. at 188-89.
260 Id.




265 Id.; FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 260-62.
266 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 172.
267 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 189-90.
268 Id. at 190.
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Motherland Party won 45 percent of the vote, Ozal did not have a strong posi-
tion because the two main parties had been kept out of the election.269 He se-
cured his position by setting the date for the upcoming municipal elections im-
mediately to prevent the other parties from organizing and by using patronage to
ensure his advantage. 270 Following the 1983 election, the National Security
Council was dissolved, though Evren remained in office as president and martial
law remained in effect in many troubled provinces. 271
1. Politics of the Motherland Party
Turgut Ozal truly led a party of the center, in that his party contained
elements of all the main parties before September 12th, including the Justice
Party, the National Salvation Party, and the Republican People's Party.272 It
combined the liberal market policies and social justice of the left with the con-
servative cultural views of the right.273 With such a diverse group of adherents,
Ozal found that his personal charisma and political acumen played key roles in
274
maintaining unity.
After Ozal assumed office, his comprehensive export promotion pack-
age began to lag, and inflation and unemployment increased. 275 Ozal manipu-
lated the political situation to his advantage in sustaining the loyalty of his party
members. He had recruited young men from provincial backgrounds to the
party-men who would never have involved themselves in politics had a vacuum
not been created by the disqualification of hundreds of politicians. 276 Ozal's
cabinet reflected his absolute control over the party and his insistence on loyalty
in that most portfolios were given to friends and relatives, many of whom were
previously not known to the public.277 Ozal also sustained his position by utiliz-
269 Id.
270 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 190.
271 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 263.
272 Id. at 268-69.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 269.
276 AiMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 193.
277 Id. The men of the party generally had less experience, less education, and less potential
than those who had been restricted from the public forum. Id. The women of the party, on the
other hand, were highly qualified. Id. Many party deputies owed their career entirely to Turgut
Ozal or his brothers Korkut and Yusuf. Id. Korkut attracted conservatives, and Yusuf and Tur-
gut's son Ahmet recruited liberals and "Princes" (men responsible to Turgut personally). Id.
Yusuf and Ahmet had ties with the World Bank and U. S. financial markets and were well quali-
fied for the top posts they received. Id. The inexperience and loyalty of many of the deputies
aided Ozal in maintaining control; some described these members as the "Turgut Ozal Fan Club."
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ing a vast system of funds created in the early 1980s (whose intended purpose
was to strengthen the executive against the legislature) to patronize special pro-
jects with expenditures outside the budget.278 No one knew the exact number of
these funds; the cabinet had developed its own rules for the funds' management,
and the revenue that supported them came entirely from special taxes that could
be levied by government decree.279 A study conducted on these funds con-
cluded that they essentially legitimized corruption and that their sole purpose
was to buy elections.28°
Turgut Ozal left martial law in place in order to implement his eco-
nomic reforms. 281 By using his patronage and charisma, he maintained party
unity while the opposition was too divided to present a threat, but by 1986, pre-
viously banned party leaders reemerged in new guises: Demirel led the True
Path Party ("TPP"), BUlent Ecevit the Democratic Left ("DSP"), Necmettin Er-
bakan the Welfare (or Prosperity) Party, and Alparslan Turkes the Nationalist
Labor Party.282 The SODEP and Populist Party merged into the Social Democ-
ratic Populist Party and became the principal leftist party. 283 Nine different
parties targeted the conservatives, but only the Motherland and True Path mat-
tered. 284 Although Demirel was still officially banned from politics, he still
managed to become Ozal's principal threat from the right285 by working behind
the scenes while Husamettin Cindoruk held the chairmanship. 286 Ecevit ar-
ranged for his party to escape dissolution through similar means; his wife
Rahsan officially chaired the organization.287
In the elections that year, the government removed restrictions on the
smaller parties in order to divide the opposition. Demirel's official reentry into
politics became a major campaign issue.288 Ozal blamed the instability and ter-
278 Id. at 190-91. The "fund economy" expanded tremendously under Ozal's control, and his
discretionary spending projects ranged from parking lots to helping the poor to perhaps rewarding
champion weightlifters. Id. at 191.
279 Id. at 191.
280 Id.
281 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 193.
282 Id. at 193-95; FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 269-72.
283 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 194-95; FEDERAL RESEARCH
DIVISION, supra note 27, at 269-72.
284 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 195; FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION,
supra note 27, at 269-72.
285 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 195.
286 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 27, at 269-72.
287 Id.
288 The Blue and Orange of Turkish Democracy, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1987, at 41, 41.
Ozal's economic policies were unpopular, and Demirel campaigned on the slogan, "Free me from
my bonds and I will free you from your poverty." Id.
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rorism of the 1970s on Ecevit and Demirel while taking credit for the current
stability.2 89 He described the election as a struggle between the old and new;
ironically, his new party increasingly turned to the same old right-wing Islamist
and neo-fascist voters as competitors siphoned off his more liberal faction. 9°
The results of this general election in 1987 gave Ozal a 36.29 percent plurality
(and 64.9 percent of the seats in the assembly), with the Social Democrats as the
principal opposition, but True Path won its own small victory with the passage
(by a small fraction over 50 percent) of the referendum allowing Demirel to
return to politics. 29 1 The votes for True Path and Motherland divided along tra-
ditional cleavages; the prosperous farming regions in Western Turkey solidly
supported Demirel, while the central Anatolian vote tended to favor 0zal.292
Even though Ozal did not want Ecevit and Demirel to return to politics,
the lifting of the ban both advanced democracy and furthered his goal of im-
pressing the European Economic Community, which Turkey applied to join.
Ozal's economic reforms saw Turkey's real growth rate rise to 5 percent per
year and the dollar value of its exports grow by 13 percent per year, a good sign
to the Europeans, but for the average "Turk-in-the-bazaar," whose income failed
to keep pace with 30 percent annual inflation, improvement seemed distant.
293
Ozal may have reestablished Turkey's credit record abroad, but his credit with
the voters eroded rapidly.
Ozal's economic package began to go awry and inflation climbed to 80
294percent. He also faced divisions within his own party over Ecevit's and
Demirel's return to politics, and many members of the public resented his fam-
ily's ostentatious lifestyle and perceived corruption.295 The local elections in
March proved disastrous, with Motherland winning only 22 percent of the vote,
despite Ozal's extensive patronage over the years.
In his unpopular position, Ozal would surely lose the next general elec-
tion of 1992 as prime minister, so he ran for president in 1989 to succeed
29729Evren. He won, but only because the opposition boycotted the election. 98
289 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 195.
290 Id.
291 Yes to What?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1987, at 52, 52; AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN
TURKEY, supra note 50, at 195.
292 Yes to What?, supra note 291, at 52.
293 Ozal's Test, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1987, at 15, 15.
294 If ISay It's a Victory .. , THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1988, at 56, 56.
295 AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 198-99.
296 See AHMADi, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 198-99; Message to Ozal, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1989, at 41, 41.
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Although legally elected, Ozal lacked moral authority because only 20 percent
of his constituents had voted.29 Consequently, certain politicians favored a revi-
sion of the constitution to allow for the direct election of the president by uni-
versal suffrage.3°  Ozal did not take the traditional nonpartisan stand of the
president: He selected a weak and pliable prime minister, Yildirin Akbulut,
whom he controlled from behind the scenes; he took steps to ensure that the
Islamic wing of his party did not gain too much power; and he actively cam-
paigned for his wife's candidacy as party leader for Istanbul. 30 ' When Mesut
Yilmaz successfully challenged Akbulut for leadership of the Motherland Party
in June 1991,302 Ozal's effective power decreased, 30 3 then it ended with the vic-
tory of Demirel's True Path Party in October 1991.304
2. Religion and the Motherland Party
Ozal made significant concessions to the Islamic traditionalists while in
office and demonstrated himself to be generally sympathetic to their viewpoint,
although his personal political leanings were generally more secular. A pro-
Western enthusiast derisively referred to Ozal as a "clerico-liberal," but this
intended insult actually reflects the very tension in the MP and in Ozal's poli-
cies.30 5 He had run unsuccessfully as a National Salvation Party candidate, and
his son Korkut had held ministerial office as a member of the NSP in the 1970s
until the military intervention. 306 Korkut had amassed great wealth after his
release from prison in the early 1980s, primarily from business and financial
links with Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
30 7
Traditionally, parties of the center-right have supported the reinterpreta-
tion of secularism in order to allow for more religious expression, with the liber-
als claiming that obsessive fear of reactionaries was unjustified and conserva-
tives wanting to use religion to inculcate moral values.308 The Motherland Party
extended the rightist trend of accommodating religion to allow Islamist elements
299 Id. at 199.
300 Kazancigil, supra note 69, at 353-54.
301 See AHMAD, MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY, supra note 50, at 199; Ayata, supra note 219,
45-46; Ozalland, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at 46, 46; Ozal's Turkey, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.
18, 1989, at 58, 58.
302 The First Tremors, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 22, 1991, at 51, 51.
303 See The Importance of Being Turkey, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 1991, at 13, 14.
304 Turkey Steps Back to Demirel, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 59, 59-60.
305 The Legacies of History, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 18, 1988, at S4, S4.
306 Funfor All the Family, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1987, at 54, 54.
307 Id.
308 See Ayata, supra note 219, at 44.
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to occupy a major wing of the party; for the first time, religious conservatives
had a significant voice in a mainline party.3° Ozal deliberately selected the MP
candidates for parliament from diverse ideological persuasions and had formed
alliances with religious organizations that allowed the MP to monopolize the
religious vote.31°
After the Motherland Party came to power in 1983, the Nakshibendi
sect (a Sufi brotherhood) evolved into a highly influential lobbying organiza-
tion.311 Ozal had personal affinities for Nakshibendi and appointed Nakshibendi
friends and acquaintances to cabinet positions. Deputies in the Assembly had
affiliations with various other religious organizations as well, and these repre-
sentatives in key government posts allowed persons within the Islamic networks
to gain positions with the civil service, provided public funds for Islamic activi-
ties and businesses, and increased participation and prestige in Islamic educa-
tion.312 The Nakshibendis and a multitude of other Islamist groups and net-
works grew in power and influence in both state and civil society, resulting in an
appreciably greater Islamic influence in society as a whole and a significant role
for the "Holy Alliance," the Motherland Party's Islamist wing.
313
The tension between the liberals and the Holy Alliance in the Mother-
land Party even affected Ozal's own family. His mother Hafize called for all
Turkish women to strictly follow Islamic principles in their manner of dress; his
daughter Zeynep married a drummer in a rock group and ran an avant-garde
boutique in Istanbul; and his cigar-smoking wife Semra publicly repudiated such
views.314 Turgut Ozal managed to reconcile such diverse opinions (and main-
tain the support of both Islamists and secularists) with clever statements like his
ruling on headscarves: Female students had been prohibited from wearing the
traditional headscarf on university campuses, but Ozal said that the students
"should be free to wear what they like in accordance with Western liberal stan-
dards. 3 15 Ozal's appeal to liberal tolerance did not impress those who saw the




311 FAIK BULUT, TARIKAT SERMAYESININ YAKSELISI [THE RISE OF TARIKAT CAPITAL] 376-90
(1995); Ayata, supra note 219, at 45 (citing Ustun Ergider, The Motherland Party, 1983-1989, in
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 160 (Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau eds.,
1991)).
312 BULUT, supra note 311, at 376-90; Ayata, supra note 219, at 45 (citing Ergiider, supra note
311, at 160)).
313 BULUT, supra note 311, at 376-90; Ayata, supra note 219, at 45 (citing Ergtider, supra note
311, at 160)).
314 Funfor All the Family, supra note 306, at 54.
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Ozal demonstrated his personal commitment to Islam in fulfilling the re-
ligious duty of the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1988. He was the first prime minister
to complete the haj while in office. 317 Although about 90 percent of Turks did
not see any conflict of interest between Ozal's haj and his duty to uphold a secu-
lar constitution, a few secular intellectuals found his action an affront to Atatirk
himself.318 Ozal claimed that thanking Allah for his narrow escape from an as-
sassin motivated his decision, but political observers saw the trip as a calculated
effort to preempt the challenge to his authority from the Islamic wing of the
party. The leader of this wing, Deputy Chairman Mehmet Kececiler, accompa-
nied Ozal on the haj.319
Ozal's government allowed the Islamists more influence than any other
regime in the modern Turkish era up to that time. In the 1980s, Turkey experi-
enced a period of conservative backlash in response to the turmoil of the 1960s
and 1970s, and the Motherland Party's political platform uniquely combined
parochial conceptions of Islamic identity with liberal economic principles that
would enable Turkey to integrate with the world economy.32° Islamists gained
respectability during this decade, "occupying a central position as the new intel-
ligentsia of what was formerly a closed movement of marginals which was
pushed by militant republican secularism to the fringes of political power, intel-
lectual activity, and social status distinctions., 32' These new intellectuals dif-
fered from shaykhs and other fundamentalist leaders because their secular edu-
cations inspired them to translate the distinctions between the various tarikat
political philosophies into a language of consensus.322 Their writings reflected
knowledge of Western social and political thought, used modern Turkish, and
presented their ideas systematically with sound reasoning, as opposed to older
writers whose logic and language were nearly incomprehensible to the lay
reader.323 As a result, more Muslims read the books, and the ideas of Muslim
intellectuals reached a larger audience.324 The development of more widespread
interest in Islam laid the political groundwork for the success of a new party
whose ideology reflected the thought of these Muslim intellectuals.
317 Hajji Ozal, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 16, 1989, at 46-47.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Binnaz Toprak, Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt Against Industry and Technology, in TURKEY
AND THE WEST: CHANGING POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES, supra note 254, at 242-243.
321 Id. at 244.
322 Id. at 245.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 245-46.
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C. The Rise of the Welfare Party
Established in 1983 as the successor to the National Salvation Party, the
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party or Prosperity Party) slowly increased its base of
support at the expense of the center-right Motherland and True Path parties. In
the 1995 general elections, the party captured twenty-four mayoral seats, a plu-
rality of the vote, and the largest number of seats in the Assembly. After the
collapse of a coalition agreement between Motherland and True Path, Erbakan
formed a government with True Path. As Turkey's first Islamist prime minister,
Erbakan's premiership raised questions over whether the government would
significantly change the secular character of the country and whether Erbakan's
election signaled an Islamic revival. This section will explore Refah's rise to
power, the policies advocated by the party, and its impact on Turkish society.
1. A New Political Challenge
With the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1980s, the Wel-
fare Party ("WP") could derive support from a broader spectrum of society
rather than just the lower income groups from rural and conservative areas that
had supported its predecessor, the National Salvation Party.3 25  The WP first
competed in a general election in 1991, winning 17 percent of the vote and 62
seats in parliament.326 In that election, True Path captured the largest number of
seats. Demirel still had to find a coalition partner to form a government-he
chose the Social Democrats rather than Erbakan.327
At this time, two major problems confronted the government: bringing
down inflation and resolving the Kurdish struggle in the southeast. 328 President
325 Although Refah can now claim more upwardly mobile businessmen in the ranks of its
membership, the regional distribution of its votes shows that its strongest support comes from the
same areas that most supported the NSP in 1973. See Ayata, supra note 219, at 53.
326 Turkey Steps Back to Demirel, supra note 304, at 59; The Worst Thing to Leave Undone,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at S5.
327 Turkey Steps Back to Demirel, supra note 304, at 59; The Worst Thing to Leave Undone,
supra note 326, at S5.
328 MANGo, supra note 228, at 38, 41-53. The Kurdish leftists in this area were influenced by
the anti-imperialist, Marxist ideology prevalent in the 1960s, and they viewed themselves as vic-
tims of Turkish ethnic domination. In 1984, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a Marxist or-
ganization, launched a terrorist campaign aimed at establishing an independent Kurdish state.
Although the terrorist organizations seek a separatist solution, such a plan would not be viable,
since Kurds are dispersed throughout Turkey and the Kurdish areas form an integral part of the
Turkish economy. Mango suggests that by consensus, the government should use its resources to
more fully integrate the southeast into the economy and to reduce disparities in income, education,
and standard of living between this region and the rest of the country. To this end, the monumen-
tal Southeast Anatolia Project (Giineyologu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP), comprising a series of
dams to produce hydroelectric power, to permit large-scale irrigation, and to greatly improve the
economy of the region, was formulated during Ozal's presidency. Id.
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Ozal recognized the Kurds as having an identity distinct from Turks, but this
recognition was exceptional among Turkish politicians, who wanted to believe
that Kurds shared the national identity and spoke only obscure dialects of Turk-
ish rather than their own languages. 329 After Demirel succeeded Ozal as presi-
dent, Tansu Ciller, an American-trained economics professor, became party
leader of True Path and headed the coalition with the Social Democrats as prime
minister. Immediately after she assumed office in 1993, inflation and terrorism
ran rampant.33°
In this context of disarray, Necmettin Erbakan's party grew in power
and influence, partly because of the Islamic resurgence in the country, partly
because of divisions among the center-right parties, and partly in response to
anti-Western sentiment. 33' Many Turks blamed the West for failing to protect
the Muslims in Bosnia, for rejecting Turkey's bid to join the EU, and for failing
to end mistreatment of Turkish immigrants in Germany.332 Turks also resented
the United Nations trade embargo against Iraq after the Gulf War because they
lost billions of dollars in border trade in eastern Turkey, a loss that depressed the
already underdeveloped region and intensified the rebellion of the Kurdish mi-
nority.333
The Welfare Party attracted the peasants who had recently migrated to
the major cities and growing towns in the Istanbul and Marmara area. In the
provincial elections of 1994, the WP received 19 percent of the vote, and it won
control of the metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Ankara in the mayoral elec-
tions, a signal of Welfare's growing importance in politics. 334 The new mayor
of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, opened his first city council meeting with a
reading from the Koran instead of the traditional moment of silence for Atatirk,
then "vetoed the election of deputy mayors from rival parties, adjourned the
council, and set about running the city himself., 335 Secularists panicked at his
"fascist" methods, and they feared that if the Welfare Party should win the next
general election, Turkey would become another Iran. 336 Prime Minister Tansu
Qiller warned, "If Turkey falls, fundamentalism will reach Europe."337 This
329 Life on the Southeast Frontier, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at S 10.
330 MANGO, supra note 228, at 30.
331 Id.
332 Id. B01ent Ecevit said that "[d]isappointment with the [NATO] allies is to a certain extent
responsible for the fundamentalist gains in the recent [ 1994] elections." Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 8 1.
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secularist apprehension, however, fails to account for the appeal of the Welfare
Party that extends beyond mere religious preferences.
2. The Strategy of the Welfare Party
The Welfare Party owed its electoral success to three major factors:
growing public dissatisfaction with the pro-secular parties of the center-right
and center-left, the WP's elaborate and efficient party organization and its dedi-
cated grassroots membership, and the increased role and visibility of religion in
Turkish society.338 The decline of the mainstream parties reflected the elector-
ate's frustration with these parties' apparent failure to solve Turkey's social and
economic problems. 339 The voters turned to the WP because the party offered
new, although untested, ideas. Additionally, a majority of the electorate was too
young to remember the NSP's role in coalition governments in the 1970s.34
The Welfare Party's radically different platform and notions of populism, Is-
lamic fundamentalism, "nostalgic nationalism for the glory days of the Ottoman
Empire," and anti-Westernism appealed to voters who had grown tired of the
old rhetoric.341
The grassroots organization of the Welfare Party provided the main ve-
hicle for reaching potential voters, and its well-financed organization included
disciplined, highly motivated membership-it had the largest number of party
workers of any Turkish political party. 42 The party activists viewed their politi-
cal cause as a mission ordained by God, and they visited individual families at
home to help them find solutions for their problems. 343 The party's organiza-
tion continually planned activities as though an election were imminent.
344
This grassroots organization offered constituents a simple, yet compre-
hensive ideology that explained what was wrong with society and what needed
to be done, helped the poor to get health care, jobs, and necessities, and devel-
oped a sympathetic personal relationship with the voters that allowed the party
members to disseminate its ideology from a strong moral position.345 Other
parties failed to show such interest in the people at the grassroots level.346 The





343 Ayata, supra note 219, at 52 (citing RUSEN CAKIR, NE SHERIAT NE DEMOKRASI [NEITHER
SHERIAT NOR DEMOCRACY] 51-59 (1994)); Sayari, supra note 338, at 36.
3" Ayata, supra note 219, at 52 (citing RUSEN CAKIR, NE SHERIAT NE DEMOKRASI [NEITHER
SHERIAT NOR DEMOCRACY] 51-59 (1994)); Sayari, supra note 338, at 36.
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Islamists had more success winning over supporters than other parties, particu-
larly in the gecekondu neighborhoods. With income from the newly emerging
business class active in the movement and from Turkish immigrants in Western
Europe, the party mobilized to disseminate its message.347
The Welfare Party's popularity reflected the rise of an Islamic move-
ment in Turkey. This movement evolved from a marginal role into "a major
force that includes political parties, professional associations and interest
groups, educational and welfare foundations, religious sects and orders, finan-
cial and investment institutions, publishing houses and newspapers, television
and radio stations, and a new generation of Muslim intellectuals. '' 34 Mosque
construction flourished, and the imam-hatip schools for training religious per-
sonnel proliferated. 349 The increasing numbers of Islamist sympathizers in gov-
ernment service aided the Welfare Party in establishing political legitimacy.
The Welfare Party, like its predecessor, the National Salvation Party,
believed that the backwardness found in Islamic society was a consequence of
the Western domination of Muslims, not through any fault of Islam.3 It taught
that Muslims needed moral recovery, struggle against Western powers, and sup-
port for technological development in order to improve the country and soci-
ety. 351 The Welfare Party criticized the oppressive rule of the corrupt govern-
ment and sought to establish a just order based on the all-powerful and compre-
hensive authority of Islam. 352 This call for a just order resonated well with the
people, as Turkey has one of the most unequal income distributions in the
world, and blaming unemployment, absence of social security, poor social ser-
vices, and widespread poverty on Western imperialism and "Zionist" exploita-
tion proved popular. 3 The WP's focus on issues of social justice set it apart
from the other parties, even the leftist parties, who tended not to discuss "popu-
lism. , ,35
4
347 Sayari, supra note 338, at 37.
348 Id.
349 Id. Since 1983, when these religious schools were deemed equivalent to secular high
school, imam-hatip graduates have attended universities and found careers in the civil service. In
a similar vein, the party began a campaign to change the policy of military academies so that
imam-hatip graduates may attend them. Id.
350 Ayata, supra note 219, at 54.
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3. Islam in Power
After the Islamists' success in the 1995 election, they were unable to
find coalition partners for a government. After nearly three months of bargain-
ing, and at the urging of business circles and the military, bitter rivals Tansu
Qiller of True Path and Mesut Yilmaz of Motherland formed a popular center-
right coalition supported by Btilent Ecevit and the Democratic Left.355 Unfortu-
nately, the personal animosity between Yilmaz and (iller made governing par-
ticularly difficult; the coalition held only because of the Islamist threat. 356 After
only three months, the government lost its legitimacy as a result of mutual calls
for probes into allegations of corruption on the parts of (iller, Yilmaz, and Er-
bakan. 151 Qiller and Erbakan successfully called for Yilmaz to hand over his
mandate to form a government and formed a True Path-Welfare coalition de-
pendent on a mutual agreement not to investigate corruption allegations.358
The moral legitimacy of this coalition might be questioned; but never-
theless, Erbakan headed the coalition as Turkey's first Islamic prime minister,
giving the Islamist forces more influence in the government than at any time
since 1923.
D. Implications of an Islamist Government in Turkey
The prospect of an anti-secular, anti-Western Erbakan government
alarmed liberal Turkish voters, and it concerned those who wished to maintain
Turkey's membership in NATO and to continue its efforts to join the EU.359
Erbakan's worldview challenged mainstream Turkish domestic and foreign pol-
icy. The Welfare Party drew on an old Islamic tradition of challenging the es-
tablished order with a sacred duty to "dethrone tyranny and install justice in its
place, ''360 but it differs sharply from other fundamentalist movements in the
Middle East such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's government in Iran or Al-
geria's National Salvation Front. Turkey has some radical Islamic fundamental-
ists who engage in violent demonstrations, such as an attempt on President
355 Turkish Politicians Agree on Cabinet; Stocks Rise, BLOOMBERG NEwS, Feb. 27, 1996,
LEXIS, News Library, Bloomberg News File.
356 See Turkey's Center-Right Parties Agree on Coalition Government, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Mar. 3, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua General News Service File.
357 Mohammad Haque, Turkey's New Government, ECON. REv., Aug. 1996, LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
358 Id.
359 Sayari, supra note 338, at 35.
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Demirel's life in protest against a defense agreement with Israel,361 but the ma-
jority of Turkish Islamists prefer nonviolent means to achieve their objectives. 362
Although Erbakan's Refah Party rose to power through legitimate de-
mocratic means, its presence as the senior partner in the governing coalition
implied a challenge to the democratic regime itself, secular institutions, and
economic policy. It pursued a moderate platform, pledging that the government
would provide "all conditions of a free market economy" and maintain "a de-
mocratic, secular and social state based in law and the principles of Atatfirk.93 63
But such statements perhaps indicated Refah's willingness to compromise in
order to obtain legitimacy as a partner in government rather than a reversal of
party ideology. Refah's part in government should not have posed a threat to
secularism as long as it had to compromise with secular parties to maintain po-
litical power, but the secular parties were right to take its popularity seriously.
1. Democracy
Was the Refah Party a democratic organization committed to constitu-
tionalism? Those who believed Erbakan used democratic methods only to gain
enough power to establish a religious government did not think the secular fac-
tions could restrain such changes if the Islamists ever attained a decisive parlia-
mentary majority.36 Others asserted that integrating the Islamists into the de-
mocratic process moderated their rhetoric and behavior and that their inclusion
in the government deprived them of their status as opposition, making them
accountable to their constituents for their policies.365 Certain members of the
Welfare Party warranted each of these classifications, and as a result, the party's
actions supported both conclusions. WP leaders stated that they supported de-
mocracy, but then they characterized it as a "fraudulent regime," challenging the
legitimacy of the system itself.366 WP leadership also sought to distinguish its
party not only from the secularists, but from the system. As Istanbul mayor
Recep Tayyip Erdogan put it, Refah "is not just an alternative to the other par-
ties but to the political regime in Turkey itself., 367
361 The attempt was made by a well-known Islamic fundamentalist, but evidence suggested he
acted alone, not as part of any fundamentalist group. Turks Find No Islamic Group Behind Bid to
Kill President, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 22, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Agence France
Presse File.
362 Sayari, supra note 338, at 37.
363 Stephen Kinzer, Turkey's New Prime Minister Lobbies for Parliamentary Support, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 1, 1996, at A4.
364 Sayari, supra note 338, at 38 (citing Coskun Kirca, Taktikler ve Ahmakliklar, YENI YOZYIL,
Jan. 4, 1996).
365 Id. (citing Miimtaz Sosyal, Arpaci Kumrulari, HORRIYET, Dec. 26, 1995).
366 Id. (citing REFAH PARTISI'NIN ANAYASA DEGISIKLIGI UZLASMA TEKLIFI 11-13 (no date)).
367 Sayari, supra note 338, at 39 (citing RUSEN CAKIR, NE SHERIAT NE DEMOKRASI [NEITHER
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Regardless of the party's actual motives, the Turkish public generally
believed it had earned the right to participate in the political process. 368 Al-
though many Turks disapproved of Welfare's position on the issues, they felt it
had demonstrated its ability to work within the system. 369 Such statements tes-
tify to the extent to which democracy is entrenched among the Turkish intelli-
gentsia and illustrate the tolerance for conservative religious groups that had not
existed until the last two decades.
2. Equality for Women
Liberal Turkish women feared for their rights under an Islamist gov-
ernment, rights that constituted an important part of Atatirk's secularism. In
some conservative areas Islamist mayors successfully segregated public trans-
portation by gender, and secular women in Istanbul worry about their future
under an Islamic mayor. Indeed, of all the outward appearances of secularism in
Turkey, the most contested is the status of women. "In the public struggle to
determine that status, the most powerful symbols remain, as always, matters of
dress. Rulings on such matters as skirt lengths and head coverings are the
moves played out on the chessboard of the female anatomy, in terms everybody
can understand. 37 °
The party's reluctance to make any firm statement on women's issues
struck secularists as a clue to its leaders' intentions,37' and the fact that Refah's
leadership included no women, nor did the party nominate women candidates,372
suggested that its adherents would not grant them the full equality demanded by
the Turkish constitution. Erbakan explicitly stated that Turks "do not want to be
represented by women." 373 Party activists, on the other hand, argue that they
have worked to expand women's opportunities, such as the ability to wear a
headscarf (hijab) as a student in the university or as a civil servant. Moreover,
SHERIAT NOR DEMOCRACY] 71 (1994)).
368 Stephen Kinzer, In Turkey, a Zealous Pragmatist, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 1996, at 6.
369 Id. "Welfare no longer fits the stereotypical image, the one you see in other religious
groups or parties out in the streets pursuing power," according to political commentator Ali Meh-
met Birand. "Now it has proved it is a party within the system. If you say you recognize and
support democracy, then you have to accept Welfare." Id.
370 Amy Schwartz, Atatiirk's Daughters, 19 WILSON Q. 68, 70 (1995). Sirin Tekeli, professor
of political science at Istanbul University and director of the Women's Library in Istanbul, com-
plained that "You never hear the answer to the question. It's pretty clear what they would like to
do [with women], but at that stage the whole population would rise up-they know that, so they're
being very careful." Id. at 75.
371 Id. at 75.
372 Sayari, supra note 338, at 40.
373 In Milestone, Islamic Leader is Turk Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter
Islamic Leader is Turk Premier].
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the WP publicly announced that it did not support the street harassment of
women on the basis of their dress, a unique position for an Islamic party.
374
Nonetheless, secular Turkish women saw a direct challenge to their pri-
vate lives with the Welfare Party in government. Women voters in the Mother-
land Party sent Mesut Yilmaz's wife headscarves in protest of the possible Wel-
fare-Motherland coalition after the elections in December; they were disillu-
sioned with the party that had portrayed itself as the opposition to the WP. 375
Secular women took an active role in monitoring the actions of the RP and train-
ing women to resist threats to their freedom-they felt directly threatened and
feared that secular men would not support their struggle when needed.376 Like
secular women, Islamist women also wanted better standards of living and edu-
cation, but they felt oppressed by the secular regime.
377
3. Economy
The economic platform of the Refah Party was less a plan of action than
it was a criticism of the government. Like the National Salvation Party, it called
for improving social justice, ending dependency on the West, promoting the
national economy, and fostering ties with the East. The WP's economic pack-
age, called "Just Order," was based on ideology rather than sound policy.
378
Erbakan campaigned against interest rates, claiming that their removal will
solve problems of inflation and unemployment.379 He also planned to eliminate
380capital investment.
Although the Islamists claimed to favor private enterprise and initiative,
they sharply criticized capitalism in Turkey and the West, decrying it as the rea-
374 Schwartz, supra note 370, at 75-76.
375 Nukte Devrim-Bouvard, Turkish Women and the Welfare Party: An Interview with Sirin
Tekeli, 26 MIDDLE EAST REP. 28, 28 (1996).
376 Id.
377 Id. at 28-29. Tekeli believes that as Islamist women who have migrated to the cities from
the countryside begin to join the work force, the secular and Islamist women will have more
common issues. Id.
378 Sayari, supra note 338, at 40.
379 Id. (citing NECMETIN ERBAKAN, ADIL EKONOMIK DOZEN (1991); REFAH PARTISI, ADIL
DOZEN 21 SORu/21 CEVAP).
380 Id. (citing MILLIYET, Dec. 31, 1995). Erbakan stated:
The State's contributions will make capital investment unnecessary. You will
press a button to set the country's production in motion. We will use receipts
for sharing. They will indicate the dues every person will receive. That will
be the monetary system. Do not forget that you cannot use greenback dollars
when you bake bread, as if they were a bunch of parsley.
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son for an "unjust economic and social order." 38' Their opposition to the priva-
tization of state-owned industries exhibited their preference for a more promi-
nent state role in the economy, even though state ownership of these industries
was commonly recognized as the primary cause of Turkey's budget deficits and
high inflation.382 Erbakan continued to advocate policies that failed when he
implemented them in the 1970s; his indiscriminate building of factories and
plants led to the rapid growth of the budget deficit and the severe economic cri-
sis at that time. 383 He also decried Turkey's application to enter the European
Union, favoring instead the formation of an Islamic Common Market. 38  De-
spite the fact that nearly half of Turkey's imports and exports involve trade with
EU countries, the Welfare Party believed that investments from Islamic states
385would offset losses from Western countries.
While a Welfare government would certainly have set back the Turkish
economy if it had been allowed to attempt such wishful schemes, forcing it to
take full responsibility for the economic effects of these pipe dreams that have
attracted the voters might have been the most effective way of publicly discred-
iting the party. Erbakan tried to increase Arab investment in Turkey during the
1970s, but the extent and scope of the market in Europe precluded its replace-
ment by countries with smaller economies. Moreover, he did not explain how
he would repay Turkey's government bonds in a system with no interest; a gov-
ernment that defaulted on payments to its citizens would not remain popular for
long.
4. Foreign Policy
Long opposed to Turkish membership in NATO and the EU, Necmettin
Erbakan dropped his opposition to the EU Customs Union agreement in an at-
tempt to allay secularist concerns.386 Erbakan also agreed that, contrary to some
of his earlier criticisms, he would not pull Turkey out of NATO, an organization
he claimed is an instrument of the United States to facilitate the creation of
"Greater Israel. 387 He still favored closer ties with Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Is-
lamic groups such as Hamas. He also supported forming "an Islamic United
Nations, an Islamic NATO, and an Islamic version of the European Union" in
381 Id. at 41.
382 Id.
383 Devrim-Bouvard, supra note 375, at 41 (citing REFAH PARTISI, ADIL DOZEN, 21 SORu/21
CEVAP, at 20-21).
384 Id. (citing REFAH PARTiSi, ADIL DOZEN, 21 SORU/21 CEVAP, at 20-21).
385 Id. (citing REFAH PARTSi, ADIL DOZEN, 21 SORu/21 CEVAP, at 20-21).
386 Id. at 41.
387 REFAH PARTISI, GENEL SE(;IMI REFAH PARTISI SE(IM BEYANNAMESI, 20 EKM 1991, at 12-
13, quoted in id. at 42.
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388
addition to creating an Islamic currency. 8 Not surprisingly, Turkey's generals
influenced the cabinet appointments for the portfolios of Defense, Foreign Af-
fairs, and Interior, ensuring that members of the True Path Party held these key
positions. Evidently, the military "hope[d] to build a fire wall between Mr. Er-
bakan and foreign policy."
389
Turkey has pursued closer ties with the Central Asian Republics since
the breakup of the Soviet Union. With the reemergence of Turkish communities
in these areas, a growing awareness of other Turkish Muslims provides a natural
opportunity for Turkey to play a role as regional leader in an area once referred
to as "Turkestan" and recognized as a cultural unit.390 Atatiirk's foreign policy
avoided any sort of "pan-Turkist adventures" for fear of provoking the Soviet
Union, but after its disintegration, Turkish politicians sought to promote rela-
tions with these Turkic republics. Milli Gazete, the press organ of the Welfare
Party, covered events in Central Asia and Azerbaijan extensively, and its editors
strongly supported closer ties with these republics.39' For example, Turkey at-
tempted to negotiate agreements to finance the construction of an oil pipeline to
transport Caspian oil between Baku and Supsa 392 and signed an agreement of
eternal friendship with Uzbekistan.
393
Erbakan's dream of an Islamic NATO was shattered by clashes between
Kurdish groups backed by Iran and Iraq.394 Oddly enough, he refrained from
criticizing the American missile attacks on Iraq in September 1996 and did not
attempt to mediate between Iran and Iraq or between Kurdish factions.395
The Iraq issue presented a setback for Erbakan, but his visit to Libya
nearly ended his premiership. 396 Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi met with Er-
bakan in October 1996, but rather than welcoming Erbakan as a Muslim brother,
he condemned Turkey for its ties to NATO and Israel and called for an inde-
388 See Islamic Leader is Turk Premier, supra note 373, at 5.
389 Stephen Kinzer, Turkey's New Leader Doesn't Rule Alone, and the Army is Against Radical
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 1996, at E4.
390 Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's New Eastern Orientation, TURKEY'S NEW GEOPOLITICS 67 (Gra-
ham E. Fuller & Ian 0. Lesser eds., 1993).
391 Id. at 68.
392 Georgy Bovt et al., In a Delicate Game, Success Depends on the Skill of the Players, CUR-
RENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Apr. 3, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
393 Uzbek President Welcomes "Eternal Frienship" Accord with Turkey, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, May 9, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, BBC Worldwide Monitoring File.
394 Stephen Kinzer, Turks' Chief Surprisingly Silent on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at 3L
[hereinafter Kinzer, Silent on Iraq].
395 Id. The major newspaper Sabah concluded that "[t]he foreign policy Erbakan wanted to
establish on the illusion of Muslim brotherhood has collapsed. The prime minister has gone on
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pendent Kurdish state.397 Erbakan did not disassociate himself from Qaddafi's
remarks, and leading politicians called for his resignation. 398 In visiting Iran,
seeking to improve ties with Iraq, and inviting a Sudanese official and Nation of
Islam leader Louis Farrakhan to a party convention, Erbakan had already con-
cerned Turkey's Western allies, but the Libya incident provoked calls for his
resignation. 9 Other visits to Egypt and Nigeria had also resulted in diplomatic
insults to Turkey, but not as severe as Qaddafi's.4°° The Libya incident, along
with charges that Refah received contributions from the Libyan government in
violation of Turkish law, provided an excuse for the opposition to call for a vote
of censure.4°' Erbakan survived the vote to topple the government, but it rang
the death knell for his pan-Islamic foreign policy. At home, Erbakan reneged
on his campaign promise to pull out of NATO; he maintained Turkey's military
agreements with Israel and extended the mandate for the U.S.-led Operation
Provide Comfort to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein.
402
5. Secularism
Despite the increasing significance of religion in Turkish society, Er-
bakan's rhetoric still considered the secular state "a policy of enmity towards
Islam" and "a system of repression against the Muslims."4 3 Refah avoided call-
ing for a return to the sheriat (perhaps remembering the Konya rally which in-
fluenced the army to intervene in 1980), but changing the constitutional and
legal rules concerning the regulation of religion (which would require a two-
thirds vote of the National Assembly) remained an important objective. 4°4
The party additionally planned "to expand the role of Islamic institu-
tions, organizations, and activities in all areas of Turkish life while placing
greater emphasis on Islam in the educational process." 5 Erbakan asserted that
397 Id.
398 Id. His failure to assert his country's honor "buried his thirty-year political career in the
Libyan sands," according to legislator Kamuran Inan. Id.
399 Stephen Kinzer, Tirade by Qaddafi Stuns Turkey's Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996,
LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File [hereinafter Kinzer, Tirade by Qaddafi].
4W Id.
401 James M. Dorsey, Turkey's Leader Faces Censure Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1996, at
A14.
4M Id.; Tony Barber, Turkey and Islam, at http://www.foreignwire.comi/turkey.html (Aug. 16,
1996).
403 Sayari, supra note 338, at 39 (citing RUSEN CAKm, NE SHERIAT NE DEMOKRASI [NEITHER
SHERIAT NOR DEMOCRACY] 71 (1994)).
40m Id.
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the Islamists are not hostile to "secularism based on neutrality in religious mat-
ters, as is the case in the United States and France"; the problem in Turkey is
that the idea has been "misinterpreted, misapplied, and exploited to the benefit
of parties that have nothing secular about them."4°6 The Welfare Party proposed
several measures to facilitate the free exercise of religion, such as adjusting civil
servants' lunch breaks to enable them to attend Friday noon prayers, opening the
National Assembly's plenary sessions with prayer, exempting pilgrims to Mecca
from exit taxes, and amending the constitutional article forbidding the estab-
lishment of religion.4 7 Although freedom of religion was an important concern
of the Welfare Party, a major secularist concern was that such freedom would
not be extended to minority religious sects, such as the Alevi.
While in government, Refah toned down its rhetoric and governed ef-
fectively at the municipal level. Party leaders adopted a reassuring formula that
states that the sheriat offers only a general program, and democracy and plural-
ism preclude its implementation without popular consent.4°8 For example, the
Welfare Party won control of the Istanbul city hall with promises to eliminate
brothels (a symbol of Turkey's social and economic ills), but it did not attempt
to close them after taking office.4°9 Instead, it has focused on delivering city
services more efficiently and with less evident corruption.410 The WP's record
in Istanbul indicated that it would moderate its agenda when in office, but even
if Refah supported a democratic government, whether or not it would uphold
basic liberties for dissenters if it were not politically necessary was not clear.
Erbakan's desire for political power probably motivated the softening of
the WP's public rhetoric, but another equally important factor was the moderate
wing of the party itself. Those who labored to reframe Refah's image as less
radical saw Erbakan as a barrier to the party's progress, "with his caricature
vision of a world dominated by Freemasons and non-Islamic bankers." 41  Many
members were more extreme than Erbakan in their intolerance and rejection of
secularism. For example, a Welfare Party member of the National Assembly's
committee for human rights once complained that Hitler had failed to eliminate
all the Jews.412 Importantly, Erbakan took steps to remove such extremists
from positions of party leadership, purging eight leaders of regional committees
406 Eric Rouleau, Turkey: Beyond Atatiirk, 103 FOREIGN POLICY 70, 79 (1996).
407 THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE, TURKEY: BETWEEN SECULARISM AND ISLAMIZATION 1 (1996)
(citing News Network International, News Service, Jun. 2, 1995, at 21).
408 Sami Zubaida, Turkish Islam and National Identity, 26 MIDDLE EAST REP. 10, 11 (1996).
4W Megan Cox Gurdon, The Mild Face of Radical Islam?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13,
1996, LEXIS, News Library, The Christian Science Monitor File.
410 Paul Glastris, A Fundamental Turn by the Bosporus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 26,
1996, at 51.
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who were considered too radical, among them the chairman of the militant Is-
lamic Raiders Association.41 3 Apparently, Refah intended to move toward a
more moderate approach, if it could do so without losing the radical vote.
E. Closure of the Welfare Party
As the military giveth, the military taketh away. The armed forces
themselves provided the initial impetus for Refah's growth by encouraging re-
ligiosity as a weapon against communism and requiring compulsory religious
education in schools. Despite these attempts at moderation, Refah could not
hold the government. Erbakan resigned in June, 1997 under heavy pressure
from those guardians of secularism, the military. Erbakan's unorthodox views
on the role of Islamic law in the country and his attempts to form alliances with
rogue states like Libya and Iran greatly troubled the secular elites. He instituted
other radical reforms that Westerners would consider a mere accommodation of
religious exercise, such as allowing female civil servants to wear headscarves to
work and rearranging the working hours to accommodate fasting times during
the month of Ramadan.4 14 He also received leaders of Muslim brotherhoods at
his official residence while wearing traditional religious dress." 5 These meas-
ures, coupled with his radical statements, convinced the military and some
members of the secular elite that Erbakan was secretly plotting to turn Turkey
into an Islamic state. Unlike the coups of 1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83, the
military did not take over the government. Thus, in one sense, Erbakan's peace-
ful departure suggested that the forces of democracy have strengthened in Tur-
key.
Mesut Yilmaz succeeded Erbakan as prime minister with a coalition of
416three secular parties. Refah was still the largest party in parliament. Signifi-
cantly, Yilmaz reversed the gains in legitimacy by the imam-hatip religious
schools. He recommended, and parliament approved, a law that increased the
years of compulsory education from five years to eight, which essentially shut
413 Kinzer, Silent on Iraq, supra note 394, at 3L.
414 Zeynep Alemdar, Turkey Shuts Down Islamic Party, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 16, 1998, at
1998 WL 7376920.
415 Stephen Kinzer, Turk's High Court Orders Disbanding of Islamic Party, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1998, at AI [hereinafter Kinzer, High Court Orders Disbanding].
416 Herve Couturier, Turkey's Islamic Party Facing Probable Ban, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Nov. 12, 1997, at 1997 WL 13432556.
2002]
65
Dokupil: The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
down the imam-hatip middle schools.4 17 Within a year, the number of these
schools in operation had dropped by one-half.
418
This move illustrates a broader pattern of suppressing what the Turkish
secularists call "political Islam." As Islamists have grown in popularity and
agitated for free religious expression, secularists view these outward signs of
religiosity, such as women wearing the hijab, or traditional head scarf, as politi-
cal statements against the secular state. This view is reflected in the constitution
itself, which states that "there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred reli-
gious feelings in state affairs and politics.' 419 The state currently controls many
aspects of religious practice-the ministry of religion even writes the weekly
sermon for delivery at Friday worship.420 Although such control may seem
harsh by standards of Western liberalism, the Islamists gave the secularists due
cause for concern. Erbakan called Welfare an "Islamic jihad army" and threat-
ened that his party's Islamic principles would one day control the country
whether the transition is "sweet or bloody.''421 He also stated that "democracy is
not an end, but a means for us.A
22
In November of 1997, Refah was brought before the constitutional court
on charges of being "a center for activities incompatible with the articles of the
421constitution on the secular state," and attempting to introduce Islamic law.
The Turkish constitution prohibits parties based on ethnicity, religion, or com-
munist ideology.424 In its defense, Refah claimed that it had upheld "democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law. '' 2S Erbakan lauded Western democracy
as the best government to protect human rights, poignantly noting that "[t]he
West should ask the so-called pro-Western parties ruling Turkey why they do
417 Maryann Bird, Turkey on the Brink, TIME, Jan. 12, 1998, at 14. Refah deputy Ahmet
Demircan called the move "a violation of all rights gained toward the freedom of faith." Id. Edu-
cation Minister Hikmet Ulugbay countered that it was necessary to "keep politics out of schools,
army barracks, and mosques." Id.
418 Sylvia Poggioli & Robert Siegel, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 5,
1998) (Transcript # 98030514-212).
419 Id.
420 Bird, supra note 417, at 14.
421 Alemdar, supra note 414.
422 Kinzer, High Court Orders Disbanding, supra note 415, at Al.
423 Couturier, supra note 416; Sami Kohen, Possible Ban on Party Divides Turkey, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, The Christian Science Monitor File. Top
prosecutor Vural Savas had brought up the Refah party on similar charges in May 1997 while
Erbakan was still prime minister. Couturier, supra note 416.
424 Alemdar, supra note 414.
425 Ceyhun Erguven, Islamic Party Leader in Turkey Fights to Prevent Dissolution, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 18, 1997, at 1997 WL 13436397.
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not respect now the Western values. ''426 He also claimed that it was unconstitu-
tional to shut down the entire party because of the actions of a few of its mem-
bers.427
On January 16, 1998, the eleven-member constitutional court found the
Welfare Party in violation of the constitution by a vote of 9-2.428 They officially
banned the party, effective February 23, 1998.429 Erbakan and five Welfare
deputies lost their seats in parliament and were banned from political activity for
five years.430 The state treasury took all of the party's assets.43' Most observers
of Turkish politics fully anticipated the ban, and 34 Welfare Party members set
up a new Islamic Party called the Virtue Party well in advance of the court's
decision.432 Tansu Qiller, former prime minister and coalition partner with Er-
bakan, publicly opposed the ban.433 Mesut Yilmaz also expressed regret at Re-
fah's closure, encouraging its members to engage in self-criticism and reassess-
ment.434 Many other Turkish intellectuals with anti-Islamist views echoed her
opposition because they feared outlawing the movement would only stir the
very political discontent that fueled its popularity and radicalize its support-
ers.435  Some Islamist hardliners wish to pursue an Islamic state based on the
426 Kohen, supra note 423.
427 Sun Yongming & Zheng Jinfa, Turkish Pro-Islamic Party Shut Down, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 16, 1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. The Welfare Party had actually
distanced itself from one of its radical mayors. After the Refah mayor staged a demonstration in
favor of sheriat law, the WP expelled him from the party. Onaran, Turkey Shuts Down Islamic
Party, supra note 421.
428 Yongming & Jinfa, supra note 427. The Constitutional Court held that the Welfare Party
had violated paragraph 6 of article 69 and paragraph 4 of article 68 of the constitution, and section
B of article 101 and paragraph 1 of article 103 of the Political Parties Law No. 2820. Turkey's
Constitutional Court Orders Closure of Pro-Islamic Party, BBC MONITORING EUROPE, Jan. 16,
1998, at 1998 WL 12504614.
429 Turkish Islamic Party Officially Disbanded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at A5.
430 Onaran, Turkey Shuts Down Islamic Party, supra note 421.
431 Turkey's Constitutional Court Orders Closure of Pro-Islamic Party, supra note 428.
432 Turkish Court Resumes Debate on Islamic Party, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 8,
1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Turkish Islamic Party Leader Continues to Fight
Ban Bid, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 19, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
433 Turkish Court Resumes Debate on Islamic Party, supra note 432; Turkish Islamic Party
Leader Continues to Fight Ban Bid, supra note 432.
434 Turkish Premier Says He Regrets Ban on Pro-Islamic Party, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Jan. 16, 1998, at 1998 WL 12504685.
435 Sami Kohen, Possible Ban on Party Divides Turkey, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26,
1997, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Bird, supra note 417, at 14. Journalist Rusen
Cakir commented that "[w]hen secularists attack Refah, pious Muslims think they are attacking
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sheriat, but others favor a more moderate evolutionary approach. 36 Although
the moderates prevailed, suppressing the Islamists' participation in democracy
might have increased the popularity of the hardliners.
The debate over the closure of the Refah party illustrated the tension in
Turkish politics between the old Kemalist secularists and a new breed of neo-
secularists who favor religion in the public square.43 7 The Kemalists fear that
"political Islam" cannot coexist with democracy. As prosecutor Vural Savas put
it, "Democracy does not include the privilege of destroying democracy. '438 in
addition, Savas rightly argues that "those who use religion for political propa-
ganda give the greatest harm to the religion. ', 39 The Islamists, however, argued
that "closing a party does not and cannot change the minds of people .... Peo-
ple can only change their thoughts if they are given better alternatives." 440 The
very fact that the Welfare Party accepted the ban peacefully attests to the
strength of Turkish democracy. 441 Conservative Muslims, however, viewed the
closure as an attack on their religion and indicated that they would vote for a
new Islamic party out of protest.442 Younger Islamic activists, however, pri-
vately welcomed the party's closure because it paved the way for their ascen-
dance to power and an opportunity to revamp the party." 3 After the closure of
Welfare, the Virtue Party took up its mantle and continued to agitate for greater
freedom of religious expression.
436 Bird, supra note 417, at 14.
437 The Refah mayor of Kayseri explained: "Single-party rule operating under official ideology
continues just like it did in Russia, along with state religion. They say this is Kemalist. I say it is
military secularism." Id.
438 Bird, supra note 417, at 14.
439 Susan Fraser, Turkey Warns Islamic Party to Accept Ban, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Jan.
17, 1998, at A5.
440 Kinzer, High Court Orders Disbanding, supra note 422, at Al.
441 Erbakan stated, "It is the slaughter of the law 40 times over, but we respect the decision."
Fraser, supra note 439. He urged his supporters to remain calm and "not to give occasion to pos-
sible provocation actions," but vowed to "show that the decision was judicially wrong" by refer-
ring it to the European Court of Human Rights. Welfare Party Leader Calls for Calm After Ban
(KANAL-7 TV, ISTANBUL, BBC television broadcast, Jan. 19, 1998). Ironically, Erbakan turned to
European international courts to vindicate his rights despite his long history of anti-Western rheto-
ric.
442 See Scott Peterson, Islam Sticks in a Town Called Mud, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 27,
1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
443 See The Hindu Editorial: Political Islam in Turkey, THE HINDU, Feb. 19, 1998, at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File. The political culture of Refah valued age, experience, and loy-
alty, offering little chance for advancement. With Erbakan essentially precluded from ever being
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F. The Virtue Party: Welfare in Moderation
The Virtue Party (Fazilet) succeeded Welfare as the main Islamist po-
litical party. Although prosecutor Savas vowed to prohibit a rebirth of Welfare
under a new name, the Virtue leaders took care to avoid another ban. 444 Despite
fears that banning Welfare would produce a more radical Islamist force, Virtue
reflected a more moderate approach. Erbakan named Recai Kutan, a moderate,
as the party's interim leader. 4 Virtue's formative period saw a debate among
the more conservative and moderate factions of the Islamists themselves, partly
due to a power struggle to fill the vacuum left by Erbakan and partly to deter-
mine the future course of the party-how much to integrate into the secular state
in order to build a viable party with a broad base of support.446 The Islamists
debated at first whether to split into several parties or remain as a single unit."7
Ultimately, the faction that wished to create a broader consensus in Turkish so-
ciety prevailed. Most of Welfare's 147 deputies in parliament switched to Vir-
tue,448 and the leaders represented the more moderate factions.
Meanwhile, the government cracked down on the Islamists. A Refah
deputy stripped of his membership by the court decision faced arrest and possi-
ble death penalty for declaring a "jihad" on the secular state.449 Erbakan faced
up to three years in prison for his anti-secular activities.450 The government also
enacted certain measures designed to quash Islamic businesses, noting that
many devout Muslims were trading only with Islamic businessmen.451 It drafted
a law ending certain privileges for Islamic financial institutions so that they
could no longer lend money so cheaply to Islamic businesses.452 The military
444 Refah Closure Goes Into Effect, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File.
445 Banned Turkish Islamic Party Members Join New Group, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 24,
1998, at 1998 WL 2229601 [hereinafter Party Members Join New Group]. Kutan said that "our
new movement will be a conservative one close to the center, and will be free from extremist
elements." Id.
446 See Poggioli & Siegel, supra note 418. Morat Zeftel, a professor of economics at Bosporus
University, noted that the political infighting among the Islamists reflected varying degrees of
militancy. The militants wanted to impose sheriat law, but the moderates hoped to create a
broader base of support. Id.
447 Party Members Join New Group, supra note 445.
448 Turkish Prosecutor Drops Strongest Charge Against Islamic Leader, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 4, 1998, at 1998 WL 6643842.
449 Arrest Warrant Issued for Islamist Ex-MP, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 1998
WL 2228843.
450 Id.
451 See Selcan Hacaoglu, Turkey to Restrict Islamic Finances, THE RECORD, Jan. 20, 1998,
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
452 Id. Islam forbids charging interest, but these banks had set up profit-sharing agreements to
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similarly stopped purchasing supplies or accepting bids from companies with
openly Islamic politics. 453 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the pro-Islamist mayor of
Istanbul and a prominent member of the movement, was jailed for ten months
for reciting a folk poem that was considered anti-secular and seditious.454 Most
importantly, the government imposed a strict observance of a formerly rarely-
enforced ban on overtly Islamic dress in public buildings: headscarves for
women or long beards for men.4 5 This dress code prevented any student wear-
ing the headscarf or a beard from attending classes or exams at public universi-
ties.456 Significantly, the ban prompted demonstrations against the policy both
by Muslim and secular students.457
Building a moderate Islamic party proved a popular move. The old-line
Islamists may have lost their appeal because they continued to conflict with the
military, which is still revered as the top institution in the country.45 8 Perhaps
more importantly, many people support the Islamists as a protest against gov-
ernment-as-usual and not because of the religious values themselves. 459 Indeed,
Islamic attire may express a frustration at forced westernization, or merely mask
an inability to afford more expensive western styles.46° The headscarf is often a
protest more than a religious statement.46' Considered in this light, the secular-
ists are correct to argue that their fight is against "political Islam," the manipula-
tion of religious symbols, rather than with religious values. At the same time,
their strong measures are unwarranted because to the extent that the Islamic
movement is a political protest and not a religious one, the chances that the peo-
ple would actually support the establishment of sheriat law are slim.
Virtue demonstrated its restraint and moderation when Kutan did not in-
sist on his rightful opportunity to head the government. Mesut Yilmaz lost the
premiership in a no-confidence vote following a mafia scandal, and the Virtue
Party, as the party with the most seats in parliament, should have taken the lead
skirt the bans. Id.
453 Id.
454 Gangs Dominate the Agenda in September, While Turkey Hints at Growing Rift with Syria,
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct. 5, 1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
455 Poggioli & Siegel, supra note 418.
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 Id. Former Prime Minister Tansu (iller has noted that "[d]espite the fact that the military is
trusted by the people more than any other institution, nonetheless we have come to the point
where I don't think the people want the military making social and political decisions on a daily
basis." Patrick Quinn, Eyeing Past, Turkey Faces Uneasy Future, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 22, 1998,
at C8, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
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462in forming the new government. Leftist Btilent Ecevit eventually formed a
minority government with pledges of support from the True Path and Mother-
land parties. 4
The party clashed again with the forces of secularism after the next elec-
tion. Virtue deputy Merve Kavakci arrived in Parliament wearing an Islamic
head scarf in direct defiance of the law banning headscarves in public buildings.
Kavakci sought to wear the head scarf to reflect her religious principles and to
take a stand for religious freedom for women.464 She was expelled from the
swearing-in ceremony amid shouts from the other deputies.465 Later, she was
stripped of her Turkish citizenship.466
Kavakci illustrates the new face of Islam in Turkey. A young, well-
educated computer scientist,467 she raises a challenge to the secular structure that
prevents Muslims from freely practicing religion. This challenge is fundamen-
tally different from Erbakan's anti-Western, anti-NATO, pro-sheriat law stance.
Yet, the law treats them both the same. Prosecutor Vural Savas immediately
instituted proceedings against the Virtue Party for attempting to overthrow the
secular constitution.468 The secularists regard any wearing of a head scarf in a
public building as a direct political challenge to the secular order, not as a mere
exercise of religious expression.469 Secular feminists view it as a symbol of
male oppression.470 But mainstream Turkish opinion no longer unquestioningly
accepts the idea that the state must ruthlessly suppress political Islam, although
it does not support an Islamist government.471 Indeed, Virtue received only 15
percent of the vote.472
462 Harmonie Toros, Turkish Party Avoids Confrontation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 1998,
at 1998 WL 23033599. Kutan stated that "[w]e have told the president that we will not be insis-
tent. It's fine if we're in the new government. It's fine if we're not." Id.
463 Suzan Fraser, Turkey's New Government Wins President's Approval, Crisis Eases,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 11, 1999.
464 See Danna Harman, Turkish Law Clashes with Islamic Headwear, CHICAGO SUN TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 20.
465 Selcan Hacaoglu, Turkish Official Seeks to Ban Islamic Virtue Party, SEATTLE TIMES, May
7, 1999, at 1999 WL 6270971.
466 Sandro Contenta, Her Head Scarf Makes Her "Dangerous", TORONTO STAR, June 12, 1999,
at 1999 WL 19360497.
467 Headscarf Controversy Still Flammable, MIDDLE EAST OBSERVER, May 19, 1999, at 1999
WL 13186433.
4M World in Brief WASH. POST, May 7, 1999, at A32.
469 One young woman speculated that the ban was designed to keep religious people in the
lower classes: "If you wear a head scarf and want to be a lawyer, the state says no. But if you're
a cleaning woman with a head scarf, then it's okay. It's a class thing. They want religious people
in the underclass and secular people in the upper class." Contenta, supra note 466.
470 Id.
471 Gordon Barthos, Terrified by a Turkish Woman's Scarf TORONTO STAR, May 21, 1999, at
2002]
71
Dokupil: The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In June of 2001, the Turkish Constitutional Court shut down the Virtue
Party.473 The case against Virtue initially consisted of continuing the banned
Welfare Party,474 and engaging in anti-secular activity, but the final court deci-
sion absolved Virtue of the charge of continuing the Refah Party and merely
punished two sitting parliamentarians for the party's alleged anti-secularism. 475
This move probably retaliated for their vocal critiques of the ouster of the Refah
Party.
4 76
The Virtue Party exhibited a much-muted form of Welfare. It continued
many of the same political practices, including helping the poor and energizing
the base through grassroots efforts, yet it moderated Welfare's rhetoric. Perhaps
the non-public presence of Necmettin Erbakan enabled this shift to occur more
smoothly. Although the Constitutional Court ultimately banned the party, the
fact that Virtue felt the need to disassociate itself from the former harsh anti-
secular rhetoric indicates that the party leaders understood that militant Islam
would make little progress in Turkish society. The development of Virtue indi-
cates that the Islamists who wished to create a serious opposition force in Turk-
ish politics, and not a marginalized fringe party, realized the need to operate
within secular parameters-not only to avoid closure by the Constitutional
Court, but also to attract the mainstream Turkish voter. Equally importantly, the
Turkish public does not support radical Islam, but it does favor increased indi-
vidual liberties.477 With such natural democractic checks on political power,
Turkey seemingly has little to fear from a conservative Islamic movement.
G. A Movement Divided Against Itself
During the Virtue Party's term of existence, a rift grew in the Islamist
movement between the traditional Erbakan-led wing of the party, and the re-
formists who favored increased religious freedom without imposition of sheriat
1999 WL 17637425.
472 Id.
473 Oya Akgonenc, A Fledgling Democracy Trampled Again, TURKISH DAILY NEwS, June 25,
2001, at 2001 WL 22003738.
474 Although Erbakan was banned from politics and had no official role in the Virtue Party,
many believed he exerted considerable influence behind the scenes. Virtue Set to Split into Two,
Americans Regret Party Closure, Erbakan Defiant, TURKISH PROBE, June 24, 2001, LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
475 Akgonenc, supra note 473.
476 Id. One of these members, Nazli Ilicak, was a prominent journalist who had long criticized
the role of the military in Turkish politics. Asli Aydentasbas, In Defense of Virtue, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, July 11, 2001, at 2001 WL 22004361.
477 Fifty-seven percent of Turks surveyed by the Turkish Daily News believed that the Consti-
tutional Court's decision to ban the Virtue Party was wrong. Esra Erduran, Rift Deepens Between
Former FP Deputies, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 16, 2001, at 2001 WL 22004475.
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rule. Although the hard-line conservatives used the tools and vocabulary of
democracy, many perceived it as a faqade to mask their real intentions.478 The
traditionalists resented the reformers, alleging that the grassroots of the move-
ment would not follow them. 479 Reformists, however, believed that the party
needed change and noted that the traditionalists no longer drew the same large
crowds.480
Recai Kutan, head of the defunct Virtue Party, formed a new Islamist
Party called Saadet (Contentment or Felicity). 48' He stated that the party would
not challenge the secularist principles of the state, but that the party "would seek
to replace the present constitution entirely to guarantee broader human
rights. 482 The Felicity Party essentially continued the Virtue Party's program,
and it faced criticism that it was just a continuation of all Erbakan's banned Is-
lamic parties.483 The old Erbakan kabal dominated Felicity's leadership, and
any attempts to change the program were viewed as an act of disloyalty or a
concession to the reformists. 484 Many in the party who wanted change in leader-
ship defected to the rival group.485
The reform movement organized under the name Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP, or Ak, which means white or pure).486 Its leaders hoped to
turn the Islamist movement into a mainstream center-right political party.487
Major party leaders Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc stated that the new reform
party would not be an Islamist party, but a new organization that represents both
religious and nonreligious people and stands for personal freedom.48 The party
also planned to have completely transparent finances audited by an internation-
478 See, e.g., Kemal Balci, Dreams of Political Islamists Fade Away, TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 5, 2001, at 2001 WL 22005255. The fact that the European Court of Human Rights ulti-
mately supported the Constitutional Court's closure of the Refah Party bolstered this view. See id.
479 Ilnur Cevik, Reformists Say Defections from Other Parties Possible, TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
June 25, 2001, at 2001 WL 22003786.
480 Id.
481 Conservatives Form Contentment Party, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 21, 2001, at 2001 WL
22004699.
482 Id.
483 Erdogan Storm about to Sweep Through Politics, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 21, 2001, at
2001 WL 22004671 [hereinafter Erdogan Storm].
44 Kemal Balci, Felicity's Disquiet, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2001, at 2001 WL
22005002.
485 Id.
486 Ak Party Forms 51-member Parliamentary Group, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 16, 2001,
at 2001 WL 22005644.
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ally respected firm in order to avoid political traps or charges of corruption.489
The popular and charismatic former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
became the movement's leader after the Constitutional Court lifted the ban on
his participation in politics.490 Erdogan's popularity enabled the reformists to
attract conservative deputies from other mainstream parties like True Path and
Motherland. 49' He also attracted an impressive list of founding members from
all walks of life--each were well-educated and well-respected in their fields.492
Despite a great deal of initial excitement about the group,493 the secularists still
regarded Erdogan as a threat, and prosecutors began investigating the party im-
mediately. 494 Erdogan disavowed his previous hard-line rhetoric,495 and stated
that the party endorsed secularism and was against "the exploitation of religion
and.., distorting... secularism by misinterpreting it as animosity against relig-
ion. , 49
6
Erdogan is a rising star in Turkish politics, and he may well win the
premiership in the next national elections.497 In seeking to build a broader base
of support beyond the Muslim faithful, he criticizes economic failures and cor-
489 Kemal Balci, AK Party Faces Three Threats, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2001, at 2001
WL 22005669.
490 Erdogan had been sentenced to four months in prison for reciting a religious poem in viola-
tion of Turkish Penal Code art. 312, which prohibits "the provocation of the people into enmity
and hostility." Erduran, supra note 477.
491 Erdogan Storm, supra note 483.
492 Balci, supra note 489.
493 Id.
494 Suzan Fraser, Turkish Prosecutor Moves to Oust Islamic Party's Charismatic Leader,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2001, available at http://ap.pqarchiver.coni/. Prosecutors found
particularly troubling the fact that five of Erdogan's female founding members wore headscarves.
Id. The Turkish constitution does not explicitly forbid headscarves for founding party members,
and the prosecution of the party along these lines exhibits an extremely secular position. See Ali
Bayramoglu, Sabah Columnist Says Legal Efforts Against Erdogan Politically Motivated, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2001, at 2001 WL 26898831. Erdogan also experienced difficulty
because of a 1994 televised speech he had made using old-style Islamist rhetoric. Fraser, supra
note 494. Second-in-command Abdullah Gul clarified that this was just an old style that the AK
Party had abandoned. Ali Bayramoglu, Sabah Columnist Says Legal Efforts Against Erdogan
Politically Motivated, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2001, at 2001 WL 26898831.
495 In a 1995 speech, he stated that "You cannot be secular and a Muslim at the same time. The
world's 1.5 billion Muslims are waiting for the Turkish people to rise up. We will rise up. With
Allah's permission, the rebellion will start." Douglas Frantz, Turkey, Well Along the Road to
Secularism, Fears Detour, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at
http://college3.nytimes.comlguests/articles/2002/01/08/893667.xml.
496 Embattled Turkey Politician Disavows Radical Islam, Backs EU, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Aug. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24996624.
497 See Frantz, supra note 495.
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ruption of the governing parties, and supports NATO and EU membership.498
He also decries the Taliban's brand of Islam, noting that "We never supported
the Taliban rule. They represent blood and death." 499
Erdogan's shift from radical to moderate may suggest a change of heart
or merely of message. The motivation, however, is immaterial. The fact that
Erdogan's reformist party exists at all is a testament to Turkey's entrenched
secularism and democracy. Naturally, the fear of party closure or being banned
from politics acts as a certain deterrent from militant rhetoric. But that aside,
the Islamist reformists are changing their rhetoric in order to become a main-
stream party. The people of Turkey simply will not vote for a radical anti-
secularist party in sufficient numbers for them to actually change the character
of the goverment.5°°
VI. CONCLUSION
The conservative Islamists in Turkey have steadily gained power over
the past thirty years. Although still a minority of the population, today's
Islamist politicians have achieved more respectability than their predecessors by
abandoning anti-secular rhetoric and radical positions such as pulling out of
NATO or forming an Islamic version of the EU. Today's Turkish Islamist
rhetoric has shifted, to borrow from United States constitutional jargon, from
seeking to establish their own version of religion in politics to merely urging
neutrality toward the public practice of Islam.
Indeed, the Turkish government controls most aspects of religion. It
approves the mullahs, distributes sermons, and controls the education of reli-
gious leaders. Moreover, the law bans even such simple outward displays of
religious devotion as the wearing of a headscarf or a long beard in certain cir-
cumstances. Such control reflects the legacy of Atatiirk, who officially estab-
lished secularism in the country through relegating religion to obscurity.
Atatiirk's rather drastic reform measures seemed warranted at the time to end
the religious fanaticism that marked the Hamidian era, and his aim "to secure
the revival of the Islamic faith, to disengage it from the condition of being a
political instrument, which it has been for centuries through habit"50' could be
accomplished only in conjunction with secularizing reforms. Unfortunately, the
reforms did not penetrate all levels of Turkish society, nor did they attempt to
harmonize secularism with Islam.
Since the development of multiparty politics in 1956, Turkey's leaders
have continued to struggle with this unresolved question regarding the role of
religion in society. As secularism has gradually become entrenched in the Turk-
498 Id.
499 Id.
500 Islamist parties have historically received only around 15 % of the national vote.
501 KEMAL, supra note 38 at 684.
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ish context, the idea of separation of religion from the state has also incorpo-
rated the concept of free exercise of religion. Moreover, a political party's posi-
tion on free exercise has ramifications with the electorate. While the role of
Islam in politics has grown, secularism remains heavily entrenched in Turkish
society; 90 percent of Turks support separation of religion from the state and
democracy.
502
Islamist parties owe their very existence to the entrenchment of secular-
ism. Were the secular character of the Turkish republic in question, the gov-
ernment would not likely permit their participation in the political process. Yet,
secularists question whether the Islamist parties would demonstrate the same
tolerance to other groups if the parties did not have to compromise in order to
retain power.
The presence of strong Islamist parties in Turkish politics may offer an
opportunity to discuss the proper relationship between the secular state and the
free exercise of religion. As the previous sections have illustrated, the role of
religion has gradually increased since the foundation of the republic, and some
of the measures that Ataturk introduced to begin the secularizing process have
become less necessary as Turkey has evolved into a more mature democracy.
Yet, despite meticulous legislation regulating the interaction between religion,
the government, and the political process, "secularism" continues to be defined
simply as the absence of religious control over the government rather than as the
disestablishment of religion. The government still executes many religious du-
ties under the Department of Religious Affairs, including disseminating the offi-
cial interpretation of Islam for the public school curricula and funding religious
activities. Although the Turkish constitution guarantees the right to freedom of
conscience, certain types of religious brotherhoods are still officially illegal (al-
though not prosecuted) because they once posed a threat to the state. Violent
conflicts still occur between members of the Sunni majority and the Shi'i minor-
ity. Perhaps an Islamist party with concerns for religious freedom will promote
constructive debate on the role of religion in government and will work toward
resolving the tension between secularist and Islamist organizations in Turkish
society.
The secular forces in the Turkish government could also promote har-
mony in society by allowing more freedom in religious exercise. Permitting
simple outward expressions of religion such as headscarves in universities
would not greatly erode the secular structure. Indeed, because the expression is
largely a political protest for greater individual liberties, allowing such practices
could actually diffuse the motivating force behind them. Similarly, removing
some of the governmental controls over religious practices may have an analo-
gous effect on enhancing the religious faithful's approval of the government.
By contrast, continuing to close parties for vague and broadly-defined
anti-secular behavior may increase the popularity of the more radical factions of
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the Islamist movement out of sheer protest for what the people view as an un-
democratic process. A crackdown on Islamist parties and politicians thus far
has resulted in secularizing them further, but it is equally likely to solidify the
radical elements' opposition to the current system. The Islamist parties' desire
for political power and a chance to effect change within the system has probably
prevented such a result from occurring. This desire is in and of itself a powerful
tribute to Turkey's secularism.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, all international eyes have
turned to Turkey to prove that Islam does not pose an obstacle to democracy.
Indeed, President Musharraf of Pakistan has expressed his great admiration for
Atatirk and his desire to lead Pakistan in Turkey's footsteps. Turkey's resolu-
tion of the Islamist question may not only affect its own future, but also enable it
to act as a regional leader, mentoring other nations wishing to follow its exam-
ple.
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